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INTRODUCTION
1992 was the year of the right to choose. In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,1 the Supreme Court by a five-to-four vote turned back the
effort to eliminate federal constitutional protection for abortion
rights.2 Substantive due process rights to liberty, which had seemed
to be destined for gradual elimination, reemerged as a stable part of
the constitutional landscape as the Casey plurality articulated a vision
of the role of unenumerated rights in the constitutional order. The
election of Bill Clinton entrenched that decision, all but guaranteeing
that the turnover of Justices for the next four years would leave
protection for reproductive freedom untouched.3
During the past year and a half, the right to die has moved to
center stage. In Canada, four of nine justices of the Supreme Court
advanced the proposition that, under the Canadian Charter of Rights,
a woman suffering from Lou Gehrig's disease had a right to the aid
of a physician in committing suicide.4 In the State of Washington, a
federal judge acting at the instance of a terminal cancer patient, a
terminal AIDS patient, and a sufferer of emphysema, held the State's
prohibition of assisted suicide unconstitutional as a violation of due
1. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (reaffirming "Roe's essential
holding" by recognizing women's right to choose abortion "without undue interference from
the State").
3. The substitution ofJustice Ginsburg, who is generally regarded as pro-choice, forjustice
White, who dissented from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), solidifies the majority that
preserved federal abortion rights in Casey. And although Justice Breyer is unlikely to be as
enthusiastic a proponent of reproductive freedom as Justice Blackmun, Roes author, it seems
likely that he, too, will preserve the Court's role in maintaining the equilibrium reached in Casey.
4. See Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R4th 342, 349 (Can. 1993) (Lamer, C.J.C.,
dissenting); id. at 412 (Cory, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (McLachlin, J., dissenting, joined by
L'Heureux-Dube, J.).
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process.' And in Michigan, home to Jack Kevorkian, three of six
state judges in lower courts to address the subject, as well as two of
the seven judges of Michigan's Supreme Court, would have held that
the State's prohibition against assisted suicide violates the command
of the federal Constitution.
7
On November 8, 1994, Oregon became the first state to sanction
assisted suicide when voters approved Ballot Measure 16, which
permits physicians after a fifteen day waiting period to prescribe lethal
medication to terminally ill adult patients who have expressed both
written and oral wishes to die.' Implementation of the initiative was
preliminarily enjoined by a federal judge in response to a suit
5. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(declaring Washington's statutory prohibition of suicide unconstitutional because it placed
"undue burden" on exercise of protected Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest). In New
York, a similar suit was filed by three physicians on behalf of three terminally ill patients weeks
after the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law unanimously opposed lifting the ban
on doctor-assisted suicide. See Today's News: Update, 212 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1994). The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. Quill v. Koppel, No. 94 Civ. 5321, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17965 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1994).
6. See Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on "Assisted Suicide": The View From
Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777, 777 (1994).
7. In Hobbins v. Attorney Genera4 the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed three
consolidated cases involving Kevorkian. In the first case, the trial judge declared a newly
enacted prohibition of assisted suicide unconstitutional based on objections under Michigan's
state constitution to the procedure by which the statute was enacted. See Hobbins v. Attorney
Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Mich. Ct. App.), af/'d in part and rev'd in part, 1994 WL 700448
(Mich. Dec. 13, 1994). The trial judge in the second case found a federal constitutional right
to commit suicide in some instances, and therefore dismissed the assisted suicide charge against
Dr. Kevorkian. See id. The third judge dismissed the charge on the same basis as did the first
judge, holding that the method of enacting the assisted-suicide-ban statute violated the Michigan
Constitution. Id. In reviewing the consolidated cases, the Michigan Court of Appeals
invalidated the statute criminalizing assisted suicide on state constitutional law grounds, but
rejected the federal due process challenge, holding that there is no constitutional right to
commit suicide. Id. at 489-94. Judge Shelton concurred that the statute violated the state
constitution, but dissented on the federal constitutional claim, and would have held that a right
to assisted suicide is a protected due process liberty interest. Id. at 494-99 (Shelton, J.,
concurring).
In a second case involving Kevorkian, People v. Kevorkian, the Michigan Court of Appeals
reversed a state-law-based dismissal of a prosecution against Kevorkian. People v. Kevorkian, 517
N.W.2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App.), vacated and remanded, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
Judge Shelton's dissent would have upheld the dismissal on constitutional grounds. Id. at 298
(Shelton, J., dissenting). The other judges did not reach the constitutional issue.
In People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591,99674,99752,99758,99759, 1994WL 700448 (Mich. Dec.
13, 1994), five justices of the Michigan Supreme Court rejected both the state constitutional
objection and the federal due process attack on Michigan's assisted suicide statute. Id. at *8,
*14 (opinion of Cavanagh, J.); id. at *20 (opinion of Boyle, J.). Another coalition of four
justices remanded the murder prosecution against Kevorkian for further proceedings under a
new state statutory standard. Id. at *20 (opinion of Cavanagh,J.). Justices Levin, id. at *27, and
Mallett, id. at *32, each filed opinions that would have held that the prohibition on assisted
suicide violates the federal protection against deprivations of liberty without due process.
8. Timothy Egan, Suicide Law Placing Oregon on Several Uncharted Paths, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
1994, at Al; The 1994 Elections: Ballot Issues; Voters in Oregon Allow Doctors to Help the Terminally
ll Die, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at A28.
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challenging the initiative as a violation of due process, equal
protection, and the federal statutory protections of the handicapped.'
Each of the judges who has voted to permit assisted suicide has
based his or her decision in part on an inference from the abortion
cases: If a woman has a right to control her own body that allows her
to avoid nine months of pregnancy and the trauma of childbirth, a
patient suffering excruciating pain and indignity should have a similar
right to end a condition that might continue years into the future,
and should be able to exercise that right by invoking the aid of
doctors to end her life.1" That inference is unwarranted. Neither
Roe v. Wade" nor Planned Parenthood v. Casey made acquittal in People
v. Kevorkian2 a foregone conclusion as a matter of constitutional
law.'3 On the other hand, legitimate state concerns regarding bodily
9. Lee v. Oregon, Civ No. 94-6467-HO (D. Or. Dec. 27, 1994) (on file with The American
University Law Review). The trial court based the preliminary injunction on the existence of what
it regarded as serious constitutional questions about the Measure's legality in light of what it
perceived as a great threat of irreparable injury.
10. A number of commentators have agreed. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION: AN
ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVDUAL FREEDOM 26-28, 194-95, 216-17
(1993) (asserting connections between moral concerns debated in abortion and euthanasia
issues); Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REV. 857,
888 (1992) ("A constitutional right of autonomy... extends to suicide and assisted suicide,
although the extension could be resisted on plausible prudential grounds."); Tom Stacy, Death,
Privaoj and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CORNELL L REV. 490, 496 (1992) (stating that "deep
profound symmetry" underlies Roe and Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990)); Alan Sullivan, A Constitutional Right to Suicide, in SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
229, 229 (M. Pabst Battin & David J. Mayo eds., 1980); Steven J. Wolhandler, Note, Voluntary
Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REv.
363, 374-75 (1984) (arguing that Roes protection of competent persons' rights to make their
own decisions concerning personal and moral matters can be extended to protect competent
persons' requests for voluntary, active euthanasia, as well as to individuals who assist patients in
carrying out voluntary request to die).
Professor Sedler, counsel for the plantiffs in Hobbins, 518 N.W.2d 487, takes the position that
"Wlust as the personal autonomy reflected in the constitutional right of reproductive freedom
protects both the right of a woman to use contraception to prevent pregnancy from occurring
and her right to have an abortion to terminate an unwanted pregnancy that has already
occurred, the right of a terminally ill person to bodily integrity includes the right to hasten
inevitable death." Sedler, supra note 6, at 788. But cf. id. at 794 (arguing that courts would
sustain constitutionality of ban on suicide "as applied to persons who are not terminally ill or
not so physically debilitated so that their life has become unendurable").
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. 517 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. CL App.), vacated, Nos. 99591,99674,99752,99758, 99759,1994
WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
13. Abortion and the right to die are certainly linked for many abortion opponents; the
proposition that the interest in preserving all fetal life is a compelling obligation of the State is
consistent with the position that the State has an obligation to preserve the life of adults against
suicide. See, e.g., Nomination of Stephen Breyer to be an AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (July 15, 1994) (testimony of Paige
Comstock Cunningham, president and attorney for Americans United for Life, opposingJustice
Breyer's nomination because of his pro-choice position, and linking abortion rights to protection
of assisted suicide), available through Federal Document Clearing House, inWeslaw, UStestimony
database, 1994 WL 372056; cf Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics in the Language of the Law, 24 HASTINGS
CENTER REP.,July-Aug. 1994, at 16, 18-19 (arguing that Supreme Court in Cruzan was reluctant
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autonomy and personal choice would support a political choice to
legalize assisted suicide.
Assisted suicide presents our society with a fearsome dilemma.
Forbidding active assistance leaves some citizens with the prospect of
being trapped in agony or indignity from which they could be
delivered by a death they desire. But permitting such assistance risks
the unwilling or manipulated death of the most vulnerable members
of society, and the erosion of the normative structure that encourages
them, their families, and their doctors to choose life. Unlike
abortion, where the status of the fetus is a matter of intense moral
debate, in the area of assisted suicide, the State must choose between
preventing deliverance from suffering, and acquiescing in the risk of
what all would concede is murder.
The current prohibitions against assisted suicide and euthanasia
sacrifice the autonomy and dignity of some citizens for the safety and
support of others. Its elimination would reverse the terms of the
sacrifice but would not avert the tragic choice.' 4 In this circum-
stance, neither the claims of self-definition and procreational
to recognize "right to die" for fear of providing precedent supporting Roe). James Bopp,
president of the National Legal Center for the Mentally Dependent and Disabled, a prominent
opponent of assisted suicide, is currently counsel to plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality
of Oregon's permission of assisted suicide. SeeFirstAmended Complaint, Lee v. Oregon (D. Or.
1994) (Civ. No. 94-6467-HO) [hereinafter Lee Complaint] (on file with The American University
Law Review). In a prior incarnation, Mr. Bopp was General Counsel to the National Right to
Life Committee. SeeJames Bopp & Richard E. Coleson, WhatDoes Webster Mean?, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 157, 157 n.t (1989); see also Memorandum by the Society for the Protection of Unborn
Children (Nov. 2,1993), in2 SELECT COMM. ON MED. ETHICS, HOUSE OF LORDS, 1993-94 SESSION
REPORT 231, 231 (1994) (opposing assisted suicide because of link to opposition to abortion).
The rejection of abortion rights, however, does not entail the rejection of the "right to die."
In Germany, the federal constitution is read to require punishment of abortion. Donald P.
Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany: Should Americans Pay Attention, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L & POLVY 1 (1994). Since the 18th century, however, suicide and assistance
have been legal under German law. See MARGARET PABST BATTIN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH 257-
59 (1994); cf Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity of Human Life 103 YALE LJ. 2049, 2097-98 (1994)
(reviewing DWORKIN, supra note 10, and concluding that right to die may be better rooted in
moral theory than right to obtain abortion).
Although there has been no thorough analysis of the issue since Casey, I am not alone in
concluding that the abortion cases do not determine the outcome of right to die issues. See
Alexander M. Capron, Easing the Passing, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1994, at 25, 25
(stating that while "rhetoric" of Casey might support right to suicide, "reasoning" does not);
Thomas W. Mayo, Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die,"49 MD. L REv. 103, 124 (1990) ("There
is no inconsistency, or even irony, between the Court's extension of constitutional protections
to a patient's choice of medical treatment to end the biological existence of a fetus, on the one
hand, and the conclusion that the same privacy right does not extend necessarily to the decision
to terminate an incompetent patient's life-sustaining medical treatment.").
14. Dean, now Judge, Guido Calabresi coined the term "tragic choice" to describe situations
in which a legal system must allocate burdens or benefits involving great suffering or death as
to which "basic ideals are in irreconcilable conflict." Guido Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy,
28 CATH. U. L. REV. 427, 428 (1979); see also GuIDO CALABRESI & IHIuP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC
CHOICES 16-17 (1978). He identified societal treatment of euthanasia as one such tragic choice.
Id. at 57.
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autonomy, the mandates of bodily integrity, nor the theories of
equality that undergird the governing opinion in Casey demand that
society choose one result or the other.
I. THE RATIONALES OF ROE AND CASEY
Roe v. Wade is notorious as a case whose reasoning does not justify
its conclusion. The opinion invokes a mixture of history and
precedent in support of a right to reproductive privacy15 that leaves
even supporters unsatisfied. Indeed, a small cottage industry among
the last generation of legal scholars has revolved around the produc-
tion of viable alternative rationales for the right to choose an
abortion.
16
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-66 (1973) (discussing history of abortion from
Hippocratic Oath through English statutory law and early American law, and holding that right
to abortion is based on right to personal privacy derived primarily from Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty).
16. See, e.g., ROBERT D. GOLDSTEN, MOTHER-LoVE AND ABORTION 24-31 (1988) (discussing
criticisms of Roe by Supreme Court); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 270-85
(1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEiN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION] (stating that equal-protection approach
to abortion rights does not disparage view that fetuses deserve concern); LAURENCE TRIBE,
ABORTION, THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 77-112 (1992) [hereinafter TRIBE, CLASH OF ABSOLUTES]
(examining derivation of abortion rights from Constitution); LAURENcE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES 243-45 (1985) (examining Court's decision that withholding of public funding for
abortion was constitutional); Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics, Writing
for an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 141-55 (1989) (analyzing Roe's trimester
framework, and focusing on Justice O'Connor's criticisms of it); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 377-86 (1985)
(positing that Court in Roe should have ruled only on extreme statute that it struck down, and
should also have specifically addressed sex equality considerations); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendmen 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (1977) (discussing
Supreme Court's assumption in Roe that fetus is not person protected by Fourteenth
Amendment, and how this assumption influences abortion analysis); Andrew Koppelman, Forced
Labor. A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480, 486-508 (1990)
(comparing involuntary servitude and State-compelled continuation of pregnancy in Thirteenth
Amendment context); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955,
1013-28 (1984) (arguing that biological differences should be taken into account in modern
constitutional sex-equality doctrine, and in reproductive laws); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281, 1308-24 (1991) (discussing conditions
of sex inequality as factor in abortion decision, both personally for women and legally in courts);
Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1579-1645 (1979) (arguing that
abortion rights could be secured under self-defense and samaritan principles, or under equal
protection framework);Jed Rubenfeld, TheRight of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 788-90 (1989)
(arguing that prohibition of abortion is impermissible because it imposes profound, pervasive,
and persistent effects that take over totality of a woman's life); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261, 262-67 (1992) (analyzing problems and benefits of framing abortion rights in equal
protection context and situating abortion restrictions in historical context); David A. Strauss,
Abortion, Toleration and Moral Uncertainty, 1992 Sup. Or. REV. 1, 18-22 (noting that abortion rights
are important to minimize women's bodily subordination); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in
Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 2944 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, Neutrality] (arguing that laws restricting abortion violate
Equal Protection Clause); Laurence Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-50 (1973) (discussing generally Roe, with specific attention
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In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a new generation of justices tried
their hand at defending the abortion right. The governing plurality
opinion, jointly authored byJustices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
none of whom had sat in Roe, articulated three overlapping bases of
support for the right to choose to terminate pregnancy.17  The
plurality viewed the abortion right as standing "at the intersection of
two lines of decisions":1 8 first, cases that have accorded protection
to "liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions
about whether or not to beget or bear a child";1 9 and second, those
that acknowledge rights of "personal autonomy and bodily integrity,"
by "recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical
treatment or bar its rejection."" These precedents were bolstered
by a third concern that interference with reproductive freedom
undercuts "the ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the nation,"" and imposes a dominant
vision of the roles of women in society.
22
This array of rationales helps structure inquiry regarding a
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide or voluntary euthana-
sia. I argue that none of these rationales supports such a right. The
value of self-determination in situations of intimate and personal
moral conflict is engaged by claims for assisted suicide in ways that
to liberty, historical religious entanglement in abortion issue, maternal health, and group and
individual rights concerning private choice in abortion); see alsoJudithJarvis Thomson, A Defense
of Abortion, 1 PHIL & PuB. Am. 47, 55-63 (1971) (arguing, before Roe that prohibition of
abortion imposed obligation to sacrifice control of woman's body for benefit of fetus that was
both morally unjustified and legally anomolous in regime that does not equate Good
Samaratanism).
17. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (stating basic holdings in
Casey as right to choose abortion, right of State to "restrict abortions after fetal viability," and
interest of State in preserving health of mother and life of fetus from onset of pregnancy).
18. Id. at 2810.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2798.
21. Id. at 2797.
22. Id. at 2807. Both suicide and assisted suicide have been historically punished both at
common law and in Americanjurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674,
99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448, at *11-12 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (opinion of Cavanagh,
J.) (setting forth history of suicide and assisted suicide as criminal offenses); Rodriguez v. British
Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 396-97 (Can. 1993) (opinion of Sopinka, J.) (same); Quill v.
Koppel, No. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17965, at *18-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Contrary to the conclusion
of the Michigan Supreme Court and the trial court in Quil, however, this condemnation does
not in itself preclude the recognition of a protected constitutional interest under the Casey
plurality's reasoning. Compare Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805-06 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, .J.) (rejecting claim that due process protects only those practices legal or protected
against government interference when Fourteenth Amendment was ratified; citing modem
protection of right to interracial marriage, marriage of prisoners, and access to contraceptives)
uith id. at 2859-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that illegality of abortion at time of
framing of Fourteenth Amendment and widespread prohibitions at time of Roe preclude
constitutional protection).
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differ significantly from the abortion cases. Assisted suicide and
voluntary active euthanasia, unlike abortion, involve the extinction of
what all involved agree is a human life. The societal values attached
to avoiding the killing of those who do not desire to die, whether
because of medical error, the effects of a blurring of norms, or the
pervasive connection between treatable clinical depression and suicide
are absent in the case of abortion.
Legalization of euthanasia and assisted suicide, unlike abortion,
raises the specter of an increasingly cost-conscious medical system
advertently or unconsciously tracking vulnerable populations away
from expensive and personally demanding medical treatment or
palliative care toward less expensive and easier medical suicide.
Desperately ill citizens may feel themselves forced to justify their
decision to remain alive. And unlike legalized abortion, the prospect
of medical suicide threatens to taint pervasively the relations between
doctor and patient.
The principles of bodily autonomy that undergird Casey guard
against the "plenary override" of a citizen's considered choices
regarding her own body. Yet both the moral force of the prohibitions
against killing conceded human beings and the practical dangers of
legalizing assisted suicide providejustifications for interference, which
are absent in the case of abortion.
Finally, the concerns of women's equality that are implicated by
abortion are absent from the arguments for assisted suicide or
euthanasia. Indeed, while the prohibition of assistance denies to
some handicapped individuals the practical option of suicide available
to the nonhandicapped, it also arguably shields other handicapped
individuals against lethal abuses to which they are disproportionately
vulnerable.
II. PROCREATION, SELF-DEFINITION, AND THE MYSTERIES OF LIFE
WhereJustice Blackmun in Roe contented himself with the doctrinal
proposition that the "right of privacy . . . is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy,"3 the Casey plurality articulated at greater length its
reasons for holding that reproductive choices including abortion
could claim constitutional protection:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of the meaning of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.... The destiny of the woman must be
shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual
imperatives and her place in society. 4
As Justice Scalia tartly noted in his dissent, this passage is long on
evocative phrases and short on analysis that delineates the boundaries
of the rights it defends.' Working from the concerns of the Casey
plurality, however, parallels between abortion and suicide emerge.
Abortion and suicide both involve human control over the
existence of life. Both are decisions that can have defining effects on
the future life plans of the agents who make the choices. It is no
stretch to characterize both as "choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy."2" Both are deeply contested moral decisions.
The structures of the moral contests appear similar. The controver-
sy over abortion breaks into two levels. The first level concerns
disagreement over the prima facie morality of abortion. It raises both
issues regarding the status of the fetus27 and (assuming the fetus has
some moral status) debate over the moral obligation of the woman to
refrain from terminating her pregnancy. The second level contests
the right of the State to impose a moral vision upon women at the
cost of substantial concrete harms.
The suicide debate has a parallel structure. Partisans first dispute
whether taking a human life at the request of the subject is legitimate-
ly subject to prohibition and whether a particular level of suffering or
indignity is adequate to outweigh the moral force of the prohibition.
24. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807. The plurality went on to say that the "abortion decision may
originate within the zone of conscience and belief," and to proclaim, that like contraception,
abortion decisions constitute "personal decisions concerning not only the meaning of
procreation but also human responsibility and respect for it." Id.
25. Id. at 2876 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) ("It is obvious to anyone applying 'reasonedjudgment'
that the same adjectives can be applied to many forms of conduct that this Court... has held
are not entitled to constitutional protection . ... Those adjectives might be applied, for
example, to homosexual sodomy, polygamy, adult incest, and suicide.").
26. Id. at 2807.
27. Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between the claim that a fetus is entitled to protection
by virtue of its own interests and rights, and the claim that a fetus should be protected by virtue
of the "sacred" character of human life. DWORSUN, supra note 10, at 24-26. Both claims go to
the initial question of whether destruction of the fetus is a prima facie moral wrong. Id.
Professor Dworkin acknowledges that if the abortion debate turned on the fetus' status as a
being with rights and interests, the resolution of the abortion controversy would be 'logically
disconnected" from the issues of euthanasia or assisted suicide. Id. at 27. He argues, however,
that because the issue is the "sacred" character of human life, and the basis and means of
showing respect for that sacral quality, conclusions about abortion imply conclusions about
euthanasia. Id. at 27-28. At least as a constitutional matter, I disagree.
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They then disagree over whether the State can impose a substantial
concrete disadvantage on the basis of its adoption of a particular
moral stance.
These apparent parallels are deceiving. On examination, the
Court's resolution of the moral contests of the abortion cases provides
insufficient constitutional sanction for a right to assisted suicide or
active voluntary euthanasia.2"
Roe and Casey offer scant support for the proposition that the State's
interests in prohibiting euthanasia or assisted suicide are so contest-
able as to be illegitimate as a matter of constitutional law. The State
may grant that the prohibition imposes real and substantial costs on
both patients who seek to end their lives and on their families, but
may at the same time decide that it must impose those costs in the
effort to avoid the premature death of others and to facilitate medical
care that will preserve lives. This policy need not rely on arguments
about life's sanctity or ignore the moral anguish of its victims.
Professor Dworkin is wrong in asserting that this legislative choice
"fails to recognize that forcing people to live who genuinely want to
die causes serious damage to them."2 A legislature may acknowl-
edge the tragic sacrifice it imposes on some of its citizens, yet still
decide that the sacrifice is warranted by the interests of others.
Dworkin is right when he asserts that "[t]here are dangers both in
legalizing and refusing to legalize; the rival dangers must be balanced,
and neither should be ignored."" But whether one balance or
28. Professor Rakowski questions the parallel between abortion and euthanasia, but
concludes that the argument for euthanasia is stronger than that for abortion: "Abortion
presents a possible opposition between two creatures' interests; euthanasia does not ....
[T]here seems no counterweight to-no separate harm to balance against-whatever net
personal benefit suicide or euthanasia would bring to someone contemplating death." Rakowski,
supra note 13, at 2097. I think Professor Rakowski has it backwards, at least as a matter of
constitutional law. Cf id. at 2101 (acknowledging that secular interests in preventing mistaken
and coerced killings weigh against finding right to euthanasia but not abortion).
29. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 197. A similar assertion is made by Joel Feinberg. JOEL
FEINBERG, FREEDOM & FULFILLMENT 282 (1992) ("The enemy of voluntary euthanasia errs in
minimizing the evils of human suffering and overrating the value of merely biological life
...."). Feinberg ultimately acknowledges that "one cannot say that one of the two kinds of
mistake is in itself. . . always more serious," id. at 275, and suggests that "we had better do
whatever we can to let suffering patients determine their own course," id. at 281. This, of
course, is the autonomy argument to which I turn in the next section of this Essay.
30. DWoRKIN, supra note 10, at 198. Professors Dworkin and Feinberg argue that a decision
to force the body to live is as irrevocable as the decision to allow it to die. At one level, this is
true, for we cannot erase the experience of pain any more than we can bring the dead back to
life. At other levels, however, this conclusion is not so clear. On one hand, the memory of
suffering like all other memories does fade with time, and offers at least the possibility of being
transformed in its import by the context provided by future actions. Death by contrast ends the
agency of the deceased. Indeed, though Professor Dworkin cites Leo Tolstoy in support of the
claim that an undignified death can taint a life, DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 203 (citing LEO
TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH (1960)), the moral that Tolstoy draws is that as long as life
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another is chosen seems in the first instance to be a matter of
empirical investigation rather than abstract constitutional inference.
A. The Life at Stake and the Moral Duty to Preserve Life"
The debate as to the prima facie morality of the act proceeds on
different planes in the two situations. In Roe and Casey, the first issue
in contest is the definition of the nature and value of the entity that
is being harmed: the fetus."1 In contrast, the definition of the entity
being harmed in suicide is clear: a fully developed human life is at
stake. 2
Both Roe and Casey recognize that the viable fetus may be regarded
as a second life that can, "in reason and all fairness, be the object of
State protection that now overrides the rights of the woman."ss
Although a number of commentators have suggested that there is no
moral duty to refrain from aborting even if the fetus is regarded as a
rights-bearing person, 4 neither the majority in Roe nor the plurality
in Casey endorsed this analysis. In recognizing the ability of the State
in "reason and fairness" to prohibit third-trimester abortions, the
Court in both Roe and Casey accepted the proposition that under
some circumstances the State may usurp control of the bodies of
women to sustain a second human life.35
remains, the possibility of redemption is only a word or gesture away. To end life is to eliminate
the possibility of future action.
Moreover, in weighing the balance between prohibition and permission, the issue is not
merely the magnitude of the harms on each side, but their probability. If there is reason to
believe that doctors will often err on the side of death, see infra note 50, and/or that most
people will at some time want to live, then either a heavy burden of proof or prohibition may
maximize the probability of serving the interests of any given individual.
31. SeePlanned Parenthoodv. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-05, 2821-25 (1992) (recognizing
State's interest in fetus, and permitting restrictions on abortion after viability); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 150-51, 159-66 (1973) (recognizing State's interest in fetal life).
32. One might argue in a Quinlan-type situation, where the patient is in a persistent
vegetative state, that it is debatable whether the person is "alive." See Stacy, supra note 10, at 518-
28 (arguing that patients in persistent vegetative states are not "alive"). Quinlan rejects that
argument. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-68 (N.J. 1976). The problem of assisted suicide
and voluntary euthanasia arises in the case of competent patients, so that there is no need to
address the issue here.
33. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817; Roe, 410 U.S. at 150-51, 159-66.
34. The argument finds its roots in Judith Jarvis Thomson's 1971 Article. See Thomson,
supra note 16, at 61-66 (arguing that even if fetus is "person," this does not mean that fetus has
"right" to life, based on argument that pregnant woman should not be forced to bear child if
it would require large sacrifice on part of woman); see, e.g., FRANCES M. KAMM, CREATION AND
ABORTION; A STUDY IN MORAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 78-123 (1992) (exploring permissibility
of abortion despite possibility that fetus may have rights); Regan, supra note 16, at 1571-93
(arguing that if women are compelled to carry pregnancies to term, State is forcing them to be
'good samaritans," by legal definition, through physical discomfort and disfavored status of
pregnancy).
35. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817 (discussing viability as factor determining when State may
protect fetus); Roe 410 U.S. at 154 ("[A] State may properly assert important interests in ...
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The State's overriding interest in preventing third-term abortions
is not impeached by the fact that not everyone agrees the viable fetus
is "a person" or that the moral basis for the "viability" line is at best
obscure.3 6 By parity of reasoning, "in reason and fairness," the State
can claim interests of sufficient moment to override the conscience
of a potential suicide in order to preserve what is, by consensus,
human life.
We routinely allow citizens to put their lives at risk in the service of
personal values or in hope of economic gain. But waiver on the part
of the citizen does not totally divest the State of interest in preserving
the citizen's life or health. Efforts to prohibit the use of tobacco or
laetrile or the ban on duelling do not risk constitutional invalidation
simply because the prohibitions interfere with the freely chosen, self-
protecting potential life .... The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be
absolute."). The Casey plurality suggested also that "[i]n some broad sense it might be said that
a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of
the developing child." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817.
This "consent" claim is at least logically consistent with the proposition that the State has no
right to expropriate a body to sustain another life. The difficulty is that it is a fairly weak moral
"right" that in a "broad sense" can be "waived" very easily. As Professor Rakowski notes, "[I]f
the difficulty of avoiding the burdens of pregnancy ... should be weighed against the ...
[values] that abortion insults, why may the state not outlaw abortion when pregnancy results
from a failure to use contraceptives?" See Rakowski, supra note 13, at 2086-87 (reviewing position
taken by Ronald Dworkin in Life's Dominion).
36. Professor Dworkin points out the following three general reasons why protection of a
viable fetus is defensible: (1) viability is the earliest time at which a fetus might be thought "to
have interests of its own," in that "about the time of fetal vitality ... the brain may have
developed sufficiently so that a primitive form of fetal sentience is possible"; (2) "it is also the
point at which [the fetus'] natural development is so far along that deliberately waiting until
after that point seems contemptuous of the inherent value of human life"; and (3) it is "plainly
late enough to give women a fair chance to exercise their right." DWORKIN, supra note 10, at
169-70.
On the first two points, it is hard to distinguish the adult who seeks to take her own life.
First, she has "interests of her own,"--even if she seeks to disavow them-and more than a
'primitive form ofsentience." Second, although Professor Dworkin may not share the opinion,
there are certainly those who view suicide as "contemptuous of the inherent value of human
life"; the view is at least as plausible as a claim that all women seeking late term abortions for
nonmedical reasons are "contemptuous." And if a forfeitable claim to individual autonomy is
at issue, as the third point suggests, the suicide who doesn't take the opportunity to use a gun
or plastic bag at an early stage in the illness can, with equal plausibility, be said to have "waived"
her rights.
Elsewhere, Professor Dworkin has taken the position that fear of "the impact of widespread
abortion on its citizens' instinctive respect for the value of human life and instinctive horror at
human destruction or suffering which are values essential for the maintenance of a just and
decently civil society" are strong grounds for prohibiting post-viability abortions. Ronald
Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case N.Y. REv. BOOKS, June 29, 1989, at 49, 52; cf. FEINBERG, supra
note 29, at 53, 55-56 (arguing that killing of"well-developed fetuses.., whose similarity to real
persons is close enough to render them sacred symbols of the real thing" can be prohibited on
utilitarian grounds).
This reasoning would count heavily against euthanasia. It is absent from his book Life's
Dominion, possibly because Dworkin concludes that there is an insufficient basis for declaring
fetuses to be persons under the U.S. Constitution. See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 113-16.
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regarding actions of competent adults. Indeed, the proposition that
a contract to endanger the health of citizens suijuris is not immune
from regulation was a part of the rejection of Lochner v. New York
37
in the New Deal cases."8 On its face, therefore, the interest in
preserving conceded human life distinguishes suicide from abortion.
The Casey plurality, however, rested its argument not only on the
contested moral status of the fetus and of the woman's obligation, but
on the particularly personal status of the decisions at issue. "Beliefs
about these matters," according to the plurality, "could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State." 9 A similar observation supports protecting the decision
whether to remain alive in the face of suffering or indignity.
A decision to choose life in such a situation, if freely embraced,
could be a defining act of generosity or courage. The prohibition of
assisted suicide places that final virtue outside of the grasp of some
persons in pain. To remain alive in such circumstances becomes,
when performed under compulsion, no longer a gift or sacrifice, but
the mere payment of a tax. Despite its lack of historical roots, it is
hard to deny the force of Justice Stevens' position that "[c]hoices
about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty, and concomitant
freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our own mortality
... [are] essential incidents of the unalienable rights to life and
liberty endowed us by our Creator."'
37. 198 U.S. 45,47-64 (1905) (embodying economic substantive due process analysis based
on Fourteenth Amendment, and declaring unconstitutional New York law setting maximum
number of hours bakers could work because of law's interference with individuals' liberty of
contract).
38. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389-400 (1937) (upholding state
minimum wage law for women, and stating that "[t]he Constitution does not speak of freedom
to contract"); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 520-58 (1934) (holding that Constitution does
not prohibit price fixing of milk, and that state legislatures are free to adopt economic policies
that promote public welfare).
39. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
40. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 343 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Cavanagh's prevailing opinion in People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752,
99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448, at *12-14 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994), reasons from the accurate
proposition that suicide has been historically proscribed to the unwarranted conclusion that
there is no liberty interest implicated by the prohibition. See Quill v. Koppel, No. 94 Civ. 5321,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17965, at *18-20 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1994) (rejecting claim of fundamental
liberty interest in committing suicide on historical grounds). This reasoning is at best
incomplete. If the personal importance of the choice of whether or not to bear a child is
sufficient to import a liberty interest even in the face of a substantial history of prohibition of
abortion, the deeply personal choices regarding the end of life cannot be entirely outside the
protection of the Due Process Clause. Justice Cavanagh's rejection of this proposition may have
been influenced by the curious reliance of his analysis not on the prevailing opinion in Case
but on Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989), and the commentary on Webster by James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Webster and
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Here, again, there are countervailing concerns, for to make one
kind of personhood available is to deny others. Faced with the
possibility of "giving" the gift of release to loved ones who suffer with
her, a dying person may feel that she has no choice but to give. To
make assisted suicide legal is to require each individual to justify (at
least to herself) the decision to remain alive. We as a society may
wish to preempt that burden with the social assertion that none of us
need justify her life.41 This proposition that each citizen is equally
and inalienably entitled to life has deeper roots than the view that the
fetus should be regarded as having moral rights. By making assisted
suicide illegal we turn the decision to choose life from an act for
which the citizen can be accused of selfishness into an instance of rule
abiding.
B. Sacrifice for Contested Ends
The second dimension of controversy that appears parallel for
abortion and assisted suicide concerns the claim that a contested
moral issue should not be the basis for imposing an abhorrent destiny
upon objecting individuals. If it were possible to compare the threat
of compulsory motherhood with the specter of a life of two, four, ten,
or twenty years of painful, paralyzed dependency, one would have to
judge the impact of the prohibition of suicide to be at least as great,
and in many cases far greater, than the imposition on the life of a
woman for whom abortion is prohibited. The moral stakes can be
fully as momentous in the suicide case: whether to endure suffering
and indignity in the interests of an ideal of human life or a hope of
redemption (secular or religious) is a choice that can "define one's
own concept of existence" and shape the "destiny" of a woman as fully
as the decision whether or not to bear a pregnancy to term.
To impose such a resolution in the interests of a contestable and
contested moral vision seems equally problematic in both cases. As
Professor Dworkin argues:
The appeal to the sanctity of life here raises the same crucial
political and constitutional issue that it raises in abortion. Once
again the critical question is whether a decent society will choose
coercion or responsibility, whether it will seek to impose a collective
judgment on matters of the most profound spiritual character on
the Future of Substantive Due Process, 28 DUQ. L. REv. 271 (1990) (stating that Webster signalled
disagreement on Court concerning reconsideration standard of Roe as well as recognizing that
Roe was unconstitutional). Kevorkian, 1994 WL 700448, at *39 n.47.
41. SeeJ. David Velleman, Against the Right toDie, 17J. MED. & PHIL 665, 675 (1992) ("[Tlo
offer the option of dying may be to give people new reasons for dying.").
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everyone or... allow and ask its citizens to make the most central,
personality defining judgments about their lives for themselves ....
The great moral issues of abortion and euthanasia ... have a
similar structure. Each involves not just decisions about the rights
and interests of particular people, but about the intrinsic cosmic
importance of human life itself.... [T] he values in question are
at the center of everyone's lives and no one can treat them as trivial
enough to accept other peoples' orders about what they mean.
Making someone die in a way that others approve but he believes
is a horrifying contradiction of his life is a devastating, odious form
of tyranny.
42
42. DWOIvuN, supra note 10, at 216-17. Professor Dworkin believes that the constitutional
rights that, in his view, underpin both the right to obtain an abortion and his position on
voluntary euthanasia could be based on either the First Amendment, id. at 166, or on the
proposition that coercion is impermissible because the effect on particular persons is great, and
the convictions about life and death matters are "fundamental to our overall moral personali-
ties," id. at 154-55.
The first claim has the allegiance only ofJustice Stevens, but the second is congruent with the
reasoning of the Casey plurality. Dworkin argues that, despite the settled constitutional
proposition that moral disapprobation of the intrinsic worth of an act may be sufficient basis to
prohibit it, the substantial impact of suicide prohibition on the lives of its subjects moves it into
a different category.
A state may not curtail liberty, in order to protect an intrinsic value, when the effect
on one group of citizens would be special and grave, when the community is seriously
divided about what respect for that value requires, and when people's opinions about
the nature of that value reflect essentially religious convictions that are fundamental
to moral personality.
Id. at 157.
As a potential draftee into the Vietnam War, I would have been comforted by this proposition
in 1970, but in light of the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), and the history of
American conscription, I doubt its constitutional validity. Cf. United States v. Kozminski, 487
U.S. 931, 943-44 (1988).
The fabric of American constitutional history does cast doubt on at least one of the classic
arguments for legally discouraging suicide. Opponents of suicide from Plato (Laws) and
Aristotle (Ethics) to Aquinas (Summa Theologica) to Rousseau (The Social Contract and The Second
Discourse) have taken the position that suicide is a violation of the duty the citizen owes the
community. SeeThomasJ. Martzen et aL, Suicid A ConstitutionalRight, 24 DUQ. L REV. 1, 20-50
(1985) (tracing views of suicide from ancient Greco-Roman culture to 18th century political
philosophers). The common law prohibition rested in part on the parallel claim that the king
has an interest in the preservation of his subjects. Id. at 60-83; see also Rodriguez v. British
Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 397 (Can. 1993) (opinion of Sopinka, J.) (stating common law
concept that suicide offended God's and King's interest in lives of citizens). This position is
consistent with the common law conception of citizenship as ineradicable.
By contrast, founded as a nation of emigrants, the United States has always viewed the right
to renounce citizenship by expatriation as an "inherent and fundamental right." SeeJAMES H.
KmTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERIcAN CIzENsHIP 1608-1870, at 267-70 (1978); PETER H.
SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHoUT CONSENT 54-57 (1985) (explaining that even
before Fourteenth Amendment, Supreme Court had reluctantly noted right to expatriation).
The right of expatriation was powerfully affirmed as a "natural and inherent right" by Congress
in 1868. See KETTNER, supra, at 344; ScHucK & SMITH, supra at 62. If the American conception
of citizenship is at odds with the claim that the State has a right to prevent emigration because
of the organic link between State and citizen, it equally undercuts the claim that the State has
a right to prevent citizens from leaving the polity by suicide. This argument, however, would
not undermine either the Kantian claim that suicide is an impermissible treatment of the self
as a means or the Millian claim that freedom cannot be exercised to permanently eliminate
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But the issue in Kevorkian and similar cases is not simply self-willed
death; it is assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. Suicide itself is
not a crime in American jurisdictions,43 and, at least as long as guns,
plastic bags, and tall buildings are freely available, most people have
the practical capacity to kill themselves.' The considerations that
are invoked by assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia extend
beyond the unadorned sanctity of the subject's life, and include the
threats to the lives of others that arise from the dangers of abuse that
might attend legalization.45
While opponents of assisted suicide have not forsaken the claim
that the State has a moral interest in preserving the life even of one
who seeks to abandon it," more recent arguments against legalizing
assisted suicide have tended to focus not on the bare interest in
preserving the life of the prospective voluntary suicide, but on the
interest in avoiding the specter of involuntary euthanasia (particularly
directed against the most vulnerable), and the erosion of support for
the lives of those at risk.47 The concrete dangers that the prohibi-
freedom.
43. See; e.g., Quill v. Koppel, No. 94 Civ. 5321,1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17965, at *19 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 1994); Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 64 (1992) (noting no state has
criminal statute that includes suicide or its attempt); People v. Kevorkian, 517 N.W.2d 293, 295
(Mich. Ct. App.), vacated and remanded, 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (noting that
"Model Penal Code, which is widely regarded as the greatest criminal law reform project of this
century, criminalizes aiding or soliciting another to commit suicide, but does not criminalize
suicide or attempted suicide").
44. Indeed, for the determined and ill person, starvation and dehydration may be a
relatively painless means of suicide. SeeJames L Bernat et al., Patient Refusal of Hydration and
Nutrition: An Alternative to Physician-Assisted Suicide or Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 153 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 2723, 2725 (1993) (stating that terminally ill patients dying of dehydration or
lack of nutrition do not suffer if treated properly); Robert M. McCann et al., Comfort Care for
Terminally ll Patients: TheAppropriate Use of Nutrition and Hydration, 272JAMA 1263, 1265 (1994)
(reporting that patients with terminal illnesses "can experience comfort despite minimal if any
intake of food or fluids").
45. See infra notes 49-78 and accompanying text.
46. Rodriguez, 107 D.L.R.4th at 397 (opinion of Sopinka, J.) (stating that there is "deeply
rooted belief in our society that human life is sacred or inviolable"); Hobbins v. Attorney Gen.,
518 N.W.2d 487, 492 (Mich. Ct. App.) (declaring that "'State [has] an unqualified interest in
the preservation of human life'" (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
282 (1990))), affd in part and rev'd in par4 1994 WL 700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994). Justice
Cavanagh's prevailing opinion in People v. Kevorhian, cited with approval the argument that
"'[r] ecognition of the dignity of human life demands resistance, rather than concession, to the
real or imaginary death wishes of those who are afflicted with pain, depression, a sense of
personal worthlessness, or a sense of burdensomeness to others,'" People v. Kevorkian, Nos.
99591, 99674, 99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448, at *39 n.45 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (quoting
Guardianship ofJane Doe, 411 Mass. 512,531-32, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting), as well as the "state's paramount interest in protecting life," id. at *11).
Justice Boyle's concurring opinion similarly relied on the "fundamental value we have assigned
to the preservation of human life as one of the last great faiths that unites us." Id. at *26 (Boyle,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. Thus, in the Canadian case, the parties agreed that "the legislation in question was
aimed at the protection of persons who may be vulnerable to the influence of others in deciding
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tion seeks to avoid fall into three categories. Each is debatable
empirically, but all rest on essentially uncontested moral premises. 8
whether, when and how to terminate their lives." Rodriguez, 107 D.L.R.4th at 369 (Lamer, C.J.C.,
dissenting); see id at 392 (opinion of Sopinka, J.) (stating that Government has "objectives of
preserving life and protecting the vulnerable"); id. at 406 (stating that legislation was designed
"to discourage those who consider that life is unbearable at a particular moment or who
perceive themselves to be a burden upon others, from committing suicide"); id. ("Given the
concerns about abuse... it cannot be said that the blanket prohibition... is arbitrary or unfair
.... "); id. at 415-23 (McLachlin, J., dissenting) (arguing that prevention of deaths not truly
consented to is legitimate end, but can be adequately accomplished without blanket
prohibition); see also, e.g., R. v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 270 (1983)
(positing tight of State to guard against inevitable criminal abuses that will occur in absence of
legislation against aiding and abetting of suicide).
In rejecting proposals to weaken the ban on euthanasia and assisted suicide, the House of
Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics relied not only on the proposition that "belief in the
special worth of human life is at the heart of civilized society," 1 SELECT COMM. ON MED. ETHics,
supra note 13, at 13, but also on concerns that "to create an exception to the general
prohibition of intentional killing would inevitably open the way to its further erosion whether
by design, by inadvertence, or by the human tendency to test the limits of any regulation," and
that "vulnerable people ... would feel pressure, whether real or imagined, to request early
death," id. at 49; see also Donaldson v. Lundgren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63-64 (Ct. App. 1992)
(upholding statute banning assisted suicide because of interest in "protecting society against
abuses" in view of "difficulty, if not impossibility, of evaluating the motives of the assister or
determining the presence of undue influence"); NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE
LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT 120 (1994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW]
(stating that "legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia would pose profound risks to many
individuals who are ill and vulnerable"); id. at 135 (indicating that while task force members
"feel deep compassion for patients in those rare cases where pain cannot be alleviated ....
legalizing assisted suicide or euthanasia to make the practices readily available to these patients
would create widespread and unjustified risks for many others").
In Michigan, the State advanced a claim, accepted by two intermediate court judges, that the
"'State [has] an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.'" Hobbins, 518 N.W.2d
at 492 (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990)). The State
also presented an argument, rejected by the dissenting judge, that "anything less than a total
prohibition of assisted suicide will eventually result in the uncontrolled and irresponsible taking
of a multitude of lives in situations far less compelling than the individuals involved in these
cases." Id. at 499 (Shelton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting above
argument, and stating that if only means by which State can regulate personal choice is by
prohibiting it "[t ] here would be no meaningful choice in the first instance"). Justice Cavanagh's
prevailing opinion on appeal in People v. Kevo*ian, did not recognize a liberty interest sufficient
to require state justification, Kevorldan, 1994 WL 700448, at *6-10, but Justice Boyle's
concurrence buttressed its reliance on the "intrinsic value of life" with concerns both about
"abuse of the vulnerable" and "the danger of increasing the risk of death for those who would
have had a reason to live had society and the participant in their demise valued their continued
existence." Id. at *22 (Boyle,J., concurring).
In Washington, the defendants argued that the State was attempting to protect two primary
interests: "preventing suicide and protecting those at risk of suicide from undue influence from
others." Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1464 (W.D. Wash. 1994). In
neighboring Oregon, the preliminary injunction against implementation of Measure 16 rested
on similar concerns about undue influence and mistake. Lee v. Oregon, Civ. No. 94-6467-HO
(D. Or. Dec. 27, 1994) (on file with The American University Law Review).
The progenitor of this consequentialist argument against euthanasia and assisted suicide was
ProfessorYale Kamisar's article, SomeNon-Religious ViewsAgainst Proposed "Mercy-Klling"Legislation,
42 MINN. L. REv. 969, 1005-42 (1958) (objecting to "mercy-killing" on grounds that "mistakes
are always possible" and that mercy killing may be used against people who are viewed as
"nuisance to other people").
48. Each of these justifications involves the sacrifice of the particular innocent patient's
autonomy for the benefit of others, despite the possibility that the exercise of autonomy is itself
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1. The killing of individuals who do not desire to die
The argument for constitutionally protecting a right of assisted
suicide stems from the concept of autonomy, from an obligation of
the State to recognize and acquiesce in the considered desires of its
citizens in important areas of their lives. While it might still be
argued that painless nonvoluntary euthanasia is more fully in the
interests 'of the patient than a painful life, Roe and Casey do not
protect a right to have the State act in the citizen's best interests. The
constitutional claim rests on an argument from the patient's right to
autonomous choice and self-definition. If the prohibitions are
necessary to avoid the death of those who actually have not chosen to
die, there is no conflict of principle between the State's justification
for the prohibitions and its obligation to respect its citizens' choices.
It preserves the life, and hence the possibility of future choice for
some at the expense of the choices of others, but need not deny the
legitimacy of choice. The dangers of nonvoluntary euthanasia arise
from three sources: the possibility of erroneous action, the spill-over
effects of removing the prohibition, and the difficulties of avoiding
requests rooted in treatable depression.49
a. Observational error
Medical literature suggests that doctors often estimate the "quality
of life of chronically ill persons to be poorer than patients themselves
hold it to be, and give this conclusion great weight in inferring,
incorrectly, that such persons would choose to forgo life-prolonging
treatment." ° In the case of intermittent, tentative, or ambiguous
morally unobjectionable. The constitutional limitations on the right of the state to demand
such a sacrifice are discussed infra text accompanying notes 138-64.
49. Although opponents have expressed skepticism regarding the voluntariness of abortions,
there is no data comparable to that in the assisted suicide realm suggesting that doctors
substantially overrate the desire to obtain an abortion, that abortions are pervasively
nonvoluntary, or that they are linked to treatable clinical depression. Indeed, the fact that
before Roe, large numbers of women subjected themselves to substantial risk, pain, trouble, and
expense to obtain illegal abortions suggests that women's choices are the result of settled and
voluntary desires. Moreover, the moral weight to be given to a less than fully considered
abortion is a matter of substantial debate, while the immorality of involuntary euthanasia is
manifest.
50. Steven H. Miles, Physicians and Their Patients' Suicides, 271JAMA 1786, 1786 (1994); see
also Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Do Physicians' Own Preferences for Life-Sustaining Treatment
Influence Their Perceptions of Patients' Preferences?, 4 J. CLINIcAL ETHIcs 28, 31 (1993) (suggesting
that not only do physicians "often underestimate their patients' perceived quality of life," but
also that they may be influenced by their own personal preferences); Richard F. Uhlmann et al.,
Physicians' and Spouses' Predictions of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY
MED. 115, 119 (1988) (stating that primary care physicians and spouses often misunderstand
resuscitation preferences of elderly patients); Richard F. Uhlmann & Robert A. Pearlman,
1995] AN ESSAY ON ROE, CASEY, AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 821
requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide, the physician must judge
the patient's "real" desires; the possibility of a lethal mistake weighs
against removing the prohibition.51 Although procedural mecha-
nisms could limit this possibility, 2 the blanket prohibition is a more
straightforward means of avoiding the errors.53
b. Implicit permission for nonvoluntary euthanasia
If euthanasia becomes a legitimate option for consenting patients
in pain, it is hard to believe that some doctors will not be attracted to
Perceived Quality of Life and Preferences for Life Sustaining Treatment in Older Adults, 151 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 495, 496-97 (1991) (citing study showing that doctors rated their patients' quality
of life significantly lower than patients themselves did, and showing that there was little
correlation between doctors' perception of patients' quality of life and patients' treatment
preferences); cf. Allison B. Seckler et al., Substituted Judgment: How Accurate are Proxy Predictions?,
115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 92, 94 (1991) (finding that physicians would not resuscitate patient
in 14 of 69 cases where patient would have desired to live in current state of health);Jeremiah
Suhl et al., Myth of Substituted Judgment: Surrogate Decision Making Regarding Life Support Is
Unreliable 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 90, 94-95 (1994) (stating that surrogates would have
withdrawn or withheld life support in 14.3% of cases against actual wishes of patients, and that
surrogates would have favored life support in 26.1% of cases against actual wishes of patients).
51. The problem is most pressing in the case of euthanasia, where the doctor responds
lethally to the patient's request. Where assisted suicide is sought, a patient's action in taking
the pills or pulling the lever will often be less ambiguous. Even here, however, there is the
danger that the patient may not fully comprehend the nature of the medication, or may change
her mind in midstream. Cf MICHAEL BETZOLD, APPOINTMENT WITH DOCTOR DEATH 212 (1993)
(providing account of Kevorkian patient who may have sought unsuccessfully to end suicide).
52. For example, Oregon's newly enacted Measure 16 (on file with The American University
Law Review), allows an attending physician to write a prescription for lethal medication to
terminally ill adult patients who request such treatment and are likely to die within six months.
It requires a 15 day waiting period, id. § 3.06, informed consent by the patient at several stages,
id. § 3.04, two oral requests and one written request, id. § 3.06, two witnesses who attest to the
voluntary and competent nature of the written request, id. § 2.02, confirmation of the medical
diagnosis and the voluntariness and competence of the request by a second doctor, id. § 3.02,
and documentation in medical records of all determinations and requests, id. § 3.09. If the
attending physician believes the patient may suffer from a "psychological disorder," the
prescription cannot be entered until a counselor determines that no such disorder is present.
Id. § 3.03.
Justice Levin's dissent in People v. Kevorkian would have required that individuals seeking to
invoke the right to terminate their lives apply for judicial authorization after a hearing to
establish their competence and the circumstances of their request. People v. Kevorkian, Nos.
99591, 99674, 99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448, at *28 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (Levin, J.,
dissenting).
53. Cf Jerri R Fried et al., Limits of Patient Autonomy: Physician Attitudes and Practices
RegardingLife-Sustaining Treatments and Euthanasia, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 722, 722 (1993)
(indicating that 1% of doctors surveyed stated they would give lethal injection if requested by
competent, terminal patient; 12% stated they had been asked to give lethal injection; 1% stated
that they had given lethal injections; 28% stated they would comply with requests for lethal
injections if they were legal; and 35% believed that such actions should be legal); Robyn S.
Shapiro et al., Willingness to Perform Euthanasia: A Survey of Physician Attitudes, 154 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 575, 581 (1994) (finding that 35.2% of physicians surveyed had been asked to
perform euthanasia, 2.2% had performed euthanasia, and 27.8% stated they would be willing
to perform euthanasia if it were legalized). But cf. Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's
Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, A Second Look, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 844, 848 (1989)
(stating that frequency of physician-assisted suicides is not known, but that they are "certainly
not rare").
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the reasoning of the court in Quinlan: Why should release from
suffering be denied to a patient simply because she is unable to
consent?54 While the current legal system does not insure that
abuses of this sort will never occur,55 it is surely plausible to believe
that the legal norm has some persuasive force in shaping behavior."
The argument is not only that bad actors are deterred by the threat
of punishment, but that weak actors will be buttressed in difficult
situations by the law's normative power. The doctor who is able to
resist financial and psychological pressures to end life by invoking an
absolute legal prohibition may be unable to refrain from euthanasia
where the barrier of absolute prohibition is broken.
The leading laboratory for modem euthanasia is the Netherlands,
where between 1973 and 1986, the law evolved a defense to charges
of homicide on the part of doctors who, at the request of their
patients, either end their patients lives or provided the means to
commit suicide as a way of avoiding "unbearable suffering."5 7 While
still formally a violation of law, euthanasia and assisted suicide in the
Netherlands do not subject doctors to legal sanction where the
patient's request is persistent, conscious, and voluntarily made, where
the patient's condition is beyond recovery or amelioration, and where
the doctor has consulted with a colleague to assure the appropriate-
ness of the request for euthanasia.58 In the Netherlands, there are
allegations that the legal permission to perform voluntary euthanasia
54. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ. 1976) (stating that if decision to terminate
treatment is "valuable incident of her right of privacy... it should not be discarded solely on
the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice"). The concerns
about abuse may go further. in Canada, "[i
] t was argued that if assisted suicide were permitted
... there would be reason to fear that homicide of the terminally ill and persons with physical
disabilities could be readily disguised as assisted suicide." Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107
D.L.R.4th 342, 375 (Can. 1993) (Lamer, CJ.C., dissenting). My own suspicion is that
institutional indifference and the impact of financial pressures are more likely sources of
problematic consent than overt coercion, but that the lure of the ability to end pain by ending
life will be the source of unconsented killing.
55. Cf It's Over Debbie, 259 JAMA 272, 272 (1988) (setting forth resident's account of
delivering fatal amount of morphine to terminal ovarian cancer patient in response to request
"Let's get this over with").
56. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
57. The fullest discussion of the evolution of Dutch law is CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING
DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS 25-48 (1991); see also BATrIN, supra
note 13, at 130-44 (discussing practice of euthanasia in Netherlands, and attempting to provide
greater understanding of laws governing euthanasia); David R. Schanker, Note, Of Suicide
Machines, Euthanasia Legislation and the Health Care Crisis, 68 IND. LJ. 977, 992-97 (1993)
(discussing evolution of Dutch laws governing euthanasia, and criticisms of Dutch system).
58. See Johannes J.M. van Delden et al., The Remmelink Study Two Years Later, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 24,25 (outlining due caution standard that physician must meet
to avoid prosecution for euthanasia or assisted suicide under Dutch law).
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has been expanded by some doctors to implicitly license nonvoluntary
or involuntary euthanasia. 9
The allegations have empirical support. The most recent estimates
are that between 2% and 4% of the 129,000 annual deaths in the
Netherlands result from either physician-assisted suicide or voluntary
euthanasia of the sort that is legally sanctioned.' These same
studies conclude that between 0.8% and 1.6% of Dutch deaths
involved illegal active interventions by physicians to end their patients'
lives without an express request by the patient.6' Furthermore, in
59. See GOMEz, supra note 57, at 128-39 (arguing that evolution of Dutch law on euthanasia
has resulted in narrowing of "instances in which [euthanasia] practice will be prosecuted," and
calling for implementation of greater control and review of euthanasia practice); Richard
Fenigsen, A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, Supp. at 22,
24-26 (asserting that voluntariness of 'voluntary euthanasia" is "often counterfeit and always
questionable"); cf. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 421 (Can. 1993)
(McClachlin,J., dissenting) (acknowledging "evidence from foreignjurisdictions indicating that
legal codes which permit assisted suicide may be linked to cases of involuntary deaths of aging
and disabled," although maintaining support for legalization of euthanasia). But see Henk
Rigter, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: DistinguishingFacts from Fiction, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,Jan.-
Feb. 1989, Supp. at 31, 31-32 (repudiating existence of "involuntary" euthanasia).
60. SeeJohn Habgood, The End of Life in Medical Practice, A Review of a Report by the Netherlands
CentralBureau of Statistics, 199Z 27J. ROYAL C. PHYSICIAS LONDON 133,133 (1993) (setting forth
results of anonymous survey of doctors involved in deaths from July 1 to November 30, 1990,
indicating that 2.7% of deaths involved prescription of drug to hasten death and 12.5% involved
prescription of increased pain relief with aim of hastening death); Paul J. van der Maas et al.,
Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End ofLife, 338 LANCET 669, 669-70 (1991)
(reporting findings of three-part study completed for Netherlands' Remmelink Commission).
The study included interviews with a sample of 405 physicians from various disciplines, a sample
of 7000 deaths that occurred from August 1 to December 1, 1990, and a prospective study in
which the 405 physicians provided information about every death in their practice during the
six months after the interview conducted for the first part of the study. Van der Maas' group
reported that of the total deaths in the Netherlands (128,786 in 1990), 1.8% were the result of
euthanasia, and 0.3% were the result of assisted suicide, according to the study's best estimate.
Id. In the prospective sample, euthanasia accounted for 2.6% of deaths, and assisted suicide
0.4%. Id.; see also G. van der Wal et al., Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide. I. How Often Is it Practised
by Family Doctors in the Netherlands?, 9 FAM. PRAC. 130, 132, 134 (1992) (estimating that, on basis
of 67% response rate among sample of 1042 of all 6300 family physicians in Netherlands, for
1986-89, 2000 euthanasia or assisted suicides were performed annually by family doctors, and
further estimating that rate of [Euthanasia/Assisted Suicide] for home deaths is 4%); Maurice
A.M. de Wachter, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 23, 23-
24) (quoting Dr. E. Borts-Eilers, Vice Chairman of Health Council of the Netherlands, as stating
that, as of December 1990, 4000-6000 incidences of euthanasia occurred annually, equivalent
to 3-4.5% of all deaths).
61. See Habgood, supra note 60, at 133 (stating that in 2.7% of deaths that involved
prescribing drugs to hasten death, only 134 of 174 deaths involved "express requests"); van
Delden et al., supra note 58, at 24 (finding that, out of 129,000 annual deaths in Netherlands,
an estimated 1000 cases, or 0.8%, were result of life-terminating acts undertaken without
patient's explicit request); Loes Pijnenborg et al., Life Terminating Acts Without Explicit Request of
Patient, 341 LANcEr 1196, 1197 (1993) (reporting Remmelink Study results that found 0.8% to
1.6% of examined deaths were result of life-terminating acts without explicit request of patient);
Translated Abstract of M.T. Muller et al., Levensbeeindigend handelen door huisartsen en
verpleeghuisartsen zonder verzoek van de patient [Life-Terminating Actions by Family Practitioners and
Nursing Home Physicians Without the Patient's Request], 138 NED TIJDSCHR GENEESED 395, 395
(1994), available in MEDLINE (stating that, in random sample of 521 Dutch general practitioners
and 521 nursing home doctors responding to anonymous questionnaire, 65 general practitioners
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the far larger proportions of Dutch deaths attributable to withholding
or withdrawals of treatment (17.5% of deaths) or increased dosages
of painkillers (17.5% of deaths), express consent of the patient was
absent in the majority of cases.
62
c. The killing of individuals whose choice is not informed, free, and
competently made
The core of the case for assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia
erodes when a request for assisted suicide is not voluntary, fully
considered, and competently made. Professor Yale Kamisar's first
classic foray against voluntary euthanasia expressed skepticism that the
request could ever be sufficiently voluntary: "There is a good deal to
be said... for Dr. Frohman's pithy comment that the voluntary plan
is to be carried out 'only if the victim is both sane and crazed with
pain. '  This, surely, goes too far. While it is always possible to
read the pain, vulnerability, fright, and asymmetric information of
medical encounters as undercutting the possibility of "true" patient
autonomy, we permit patients to both consent to life-threatening
procedures and refuse life-sustaining treatments without falling into
metaphysical paralysis over the tainted nature of the patient's will.
Nonetheless, Professor Kamisar's later sobering apprehension is that
euthanasia or assisted suicide will often be invoked by persons
affected by diagnosable and treatable psychiatric illnesses. He refers
to literature suggesting that "suicide rarely occurs in the absence of
a major psychiatric disorder" combined with "the inability of
depressed persons to recognize the severity of their own symptoms
and the failure of primary physicians to detect major depression in
their patients." ' Similarly, the New York State Task Force on Life
and 28 nursing home doctors stated that, between 1986 and 1989, they had deliberately
terminated lives of 94 and 70 patients, respectively, without explicit request by patients).
This is not to suggest that all of these cases involved cavalier executions. The Remmelink
Study concluded that 59% of participating doctors had some information about the patient's
wishes, 83% had discussions with relatives, and 86% of those who died had their lives shortened
by one week or less. See Pinenborg et al., supra, at 1198 thl. III (listing study results). For
further discussion of Remmelink Study, see generally van der Maas et al., supra note 60.
62. See van der Maas et al., supra note 60, at 672. In 60% of the cases involving increased
dosages, physicians did not consult patients before administering drugs. Of those cases, 73%
of the patients were not competent to discuss treatment. Id. Similarly, in 63% of the cases
involving withdrawal of treatment, the plan was not discussed with the patient. Id. In 88% of
the withdrawal cases where the patient was not consulted, the patient was incompetent. Id.
63. Kamisar, supra note 47, at 985-86; see also id. at 985-93 (questioning ability of patients
to voluntarily consent to euthanasia).
64. Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
May-June 1993, at 32, 38 & nn.37-39 (stating that 95% of suicide victims have diagnosable
psychiatric illnesses, with majority suffering from depression (citing Herbert Hendin & Gerald
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and the Law rested its opposition to legalization in part on the twin
concerns that "a majority of individuals who kill themselves suffer
from depression that is treatable" and that "most doctors are not
adequately trained to diagnose depression especially in complex cases
such as patients who are terminally ill." 65
Of course, the current suicide population in the United States
excludes those who are deterred by the illegality of assisted suicide.
It is entirely possible that those who are currently deterred are less
characterized by psychiatric disorders. One recent study finds that in
the Netherlands, less than a third of requests for euthanasia or
assisted suicide are granted by the physician, and that fourteen
percent of the refused requests come from patients who have been
diagnosed as having a psychiatric illness.6 6 This may be a testimony
either to the difficulty of diagnosing psychiatric problems or to the
existence of a large group of persons who choose euthanasia without
psychiatric disturbance.6 In American society, where 2.9% of the
Klerman, Physician Assisted Suicide, The Dangers of Legalization, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 143, 143
(1993))); see alsoJames H. Brown et al., Is It Normal for Terminally Ill Patients to Desire Death?, 143
Am. J. PSYCH-IATRY 208, 210 (1986) (reporting results of study that found that all terminally ill
patients in study group who had desired death suffered from major depressive illness); Yeates
Conwell & Eric D. Caine, Rational Suicide and the Right to Die, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1100, 1101
(1991) (finding that "90 to 100 percent of suicide victims die while they have diagnosable
psychiatric illness," and noting that "primary care physicians often fail to recognize or treat
depression").
For other recent discussion, see Eric D. Caine & Yeates C. Conwell, Self-Determined Death, the
Physician and Medical Priorities: Is There Time to Talk?, 270 JAMA 875, 876 (1993) (reporting
results of study that found that "more than 90% of persons" in the study who committed suicide
had "major mental disorders," suggesting that primary care physicians who examined suicide
victims shortly before death "missed or undervalued prominent psychiatric signs and
psychological symptoms"); David C. Clark, 'Rational' Suicide and People with Terminal Conditions
orDisabilities, 8 IssuEs L. & MF.). 47, 54,56-58 (1992) (reviewing studies, and stating that there
is "empirical justification for thinking that a suicide rarely, if ever, occurs in the absence of a
major psychiatric disorder," and that there is, likewise, basis for concluding that physicians often
fail to recognize depression); Yeates Conwell et al., Suicide and Cancer in Late Lif4 41 HOSP. &
COMMUNnY PSYCHIATRY 1334, 1337-38 (1990) (discussing study of eight cancer patients who
attempted or committed suicide while under physicians' care, and emphasizing that attending
physicians failed to treat depression in all eight cases); cf. Mary Jane Massie & Jimmie C.
Holland, Diagnosis and Treatment of Depression in the Cancer Patient, J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, Mar.
1984, § 2, at 25 (asserting that "depression in patients with cancer is underdiagnosed and
undertreated"). But seeTimothy E. Quill, Doctorl Want to Die. Will You Help Me?, 270JAMA 870,
872 (1993) ("[T]here is growing clinical literature suggesting some of these suicides may be
rational.").
65. TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND LAW, supra note 47, at 126-27.
66. See van der Maas et al., supra note 60, at 672 (setting forth findings based on
approximately 9000 explicit requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide received each year in
Netherlands).
67. Cf Dutch Court Expands Euthanasia Guidelines to Include Mentally ll, L.A. TIMES, June 23,
1994, at A18 (discussing Dutch Supreme Court's exemption from punishment of psychiatrist
who assisted suicide of 50-year-old woman who was depressed after death of her sons and recent
divorce).
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adult population has made a suicide attempt and suicide accounts for
30,000 deaths per year,' these are no light concerns.
2. Withdrawal of support for remaining alive
The State need not rely on a contested argument about the
absolute sanctity of human life to adopt the proposition that public
policy should minimize the pressures that impel citizens to seek death,
and maximize the forces that support them in choosing life."9
Arguments for the prohibition of euthanasia and assisted suicide are
rooted in part in the fear that legalization will unleash the opposite
incentives.
In the worst version of this scenario, legalization would set loose the
self-interested manipulation of doctors, hospital administrators, and
avaricious (or cost-conscious) family members. Incentives for cost
minimization in the emerging health care system have already
fostered fears that illnesses, particularly chronic illnesses, will be
undertreated. 0 If the need for costly treatment can be avoided by
an early end to chronic suffering, the lure of efforts to hasten the
"final exit" of patients or family members may be exacerbated.71 In
a cost-conscious system that permits assisted suicide, temptations
range from conscious manipulation of levels of care or pain relief for
68. Clark, supra note 64, at 149.
69. Cf. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 396 (Can. 1993) (opinion of
Sopinka,J.) (asserting that purpose of State's euthanasia law is to protect "vulnerable who might
be induced in moments of weakness to commit suicide").
70. See Council on Ethical &Judicial Affairs, American Medical Ass'n, Decisions Near the End
of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2232 (1992) [hereinafter Decisions Near the End of Lie] (stating that
"increasing pressure to reduce health care costs may serve as another motivation to favor
euthanasia over longer-term comfort care").
71. The Dutch seek to avoid financial incentives by providing that doctors may obtain no
remuneration for euthanasia. See Loes Pijnenborg et al., Letter to Editor, Life Terminating Acts
without Explict Request of Patients, 342 .ANCEr 308, 308 (1993) (noting that "Dutch law forbids
a physician to profit directly or indirectly by the last will that a patient made during his illness"
and that physician receives "no fee for practising euthanasia"); Pijnenborg et al., supra note 61,
at 1199 ("99.4% of population is comprehensively insured for medical expenditures and 100%
for the costs of long-standing illness. The ending of a patient's life never produces financial
gain for the physician.").
Direct fees, however, are far from the only financial incentives at work in other health care
systems. One unintentionally ominous premonition comes from the arguments in favor of
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia by the British Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party
on the Ethics of Prolonging Life and Assisting Death:
Nowadays much medical and surgical care is increasingly costly and doctors have to
ensure a fair distribution of expensive investigations and treatment.... They may
resent or even seek to dismiss this encroachment on their clinical freedom, but this is
an increasing influence on decisions about prolonging life and refusing assistance of
death, both of which may be costly in terms of medical resources.
Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the Ethics of Prolonging Life & Assisting Death,
Assisted Death, 336 LAN=c 610, 612 (1990).
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costly patients to efforts to persuade patients that their duty is to leave
their bed or estate to those who can use it better.
Less malignantly, but no less problematically, the incentive to
expend resources seeking out state-of-the-art pain management may
be undercut if a patient's pain can be ended by death. 2 There is
evidence that current medical practice radically undertreats pain,
making suicide a more attractive option than is technologically
necessary.7" The poor and isolated who have the least leverage in
seeking relief from the medical system will be particularly subject to
this danger.74
Motivations for encouraging suicide need be neither crass nor
conscious to raise concerns. Caring for a terminal or suffering person
exacts fearsome psychic tolls. One commentator observes: "There is
ample evidence that physicians often have difficulty responding
therapeutically to chronically ill or dying patients. They often
underdiagnose and undertreat pain or depression .... These
complex feelings can influence a physician to abandon a patient or
affirm a person's suicidal intent, which in turn may precipitate
72. See Memorandum by the British Medical Ass'n, in 2 SELECT COMM. ON MED. ETHICS,
supra note 13, at 26, 32 ("It is of particular concern to the BMA that less attention might be
given to effective training in controlling pain and actively helping patients address their fears
about death if euthanasia were seen to be an available or acceptable option."); Bernat et al.,
supra note 44, at 2723, 2727 (arguing that "legalizing [physician-assisted suicide] would make
it unnecessary for physicians to strive to maximize comfort measures in terminally ill patients
and unnecessary for society to support research to improve the science of palliation"); Decisions
Near the End ofLife supra note 70, at 2232 (discussing possible creation of economic motivation
if euthanasia were legalized).
One could argue that, for doctors who want their patients to remain alive, the incentive to
minimize pain is sharpened by the threat that patients will kill themselves if pain is not
adequately controlled. On the other hand, there is a documented tendency for the quality of
services to deteriorate when the most quality conscious consumers have the ability to leave the
system. Seegenerally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VoIcE & LOYALTY (1970) (discussing consumer
response to deterioration of performance through either "exit" or "voice" mechanism). "Final
exit" may bleed off patients who would otherwise challenge the system.
73. See David A. Fishbain et a., Completed Suicide in Chronic Pain, 7 CLINIcALJ. PAIN 29, 34
(1991) (suggesting that patients in chronic pain are at risk for suicide); Mildred Z. Solomon et
al., Decisions Near the End of Life: Profesional VIiews on Life-Sustaining Treatments, 83 AM. J. PuB.
HEALTH 14, 20 (1993) (concluding from study of health care professionals that "inappropriate
management of pain is due partly to lack of knowledge of appropriate techniques for pain
control and partly to misplaced fear of causing addiction");Jamie H. Von Roenn et al., Physician
Attitudes and Practice in Cancer Pain Management: A Survey fin the Eastern Cooperative Onology
Group, 119 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 121, 124 "(1993) (noting that even oncologists are often
poorly trained in pain management).
74. Cf Charles S. Cleeland et al., Pain and Its Treatment in Outpatients with Metastatic Cancer,
330 NEv ENG. J. MED. 592, 594-95 (1994) (reporting findings that minorities, elderly, and
women are more likely to receive poor pain treatment); Knox H. Todd et al., Ethnicity as a Risk
Factor for Inadequate Emergency Department Anagesia, 269 JAMA 1537, 1538 (1993) (reporting
results of study finding that Hispanic patients were twice as likely as non-Hispanic white patients
to receive no emergency treatment pain medication). These same groups, however, are likely
to suffer greatly from poor pain management if they remain alive.
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suicides."7" For family members, the costs are similar, and a plea
from the patient's loved ones for "release" from the burdens of care-
giving will often fall on receptive ears.7" Eliminating the normative
force of legal prohibition will decrease support for the difficult task
of caring for the chronically ill."
Finally, legalization may generate desires to end life where none
existed before, or dampen desires to live. The Canadian Supreme
Court phrased the case negatively:
In upholding the respect for life [prohibition] may discourage
those who consider that life is unbearable at a particular moment
or those who perceive themselves to be a burden upon others from
committing suicide. To permit a physician to lawfully participate
in taking life would send a signal that there are circumstances in
which the state approves of suicide.78
But the point can be made positively: The refusal to make exceptions
for those who are physically impaired sends the message that they are
valued no less than their physically able fellows, and equally entitled
to life.
75. Miles, supra note 50, at 1786; see also Grant Gillett, Killing, Letting Die and Moral
Perception, 8 BIoETHICS 312, 323-25 (1994) (arguing that "easy, instant and decisive answer"
provided by euthanasia appeals to technical enthusiasm and is likely to "do away with finely
balanced ... moral judgment").
76. While realizing the limits of survey data, it is striking that 47% ofnAmericans who would
consider ending their lives in the case of terminal illness state that they would do so "because
of fears of burdening their families." See RobertJ. Blendon et al., Should Physicians Aid Their
Patients inDying?: The Public Perspectiv4 267JAMA 2658, 2660 (1992). By contrast, 20% would
not want to live in pain, and 19% would not want to be dependent on machines. Id.
A retrospective study in the Netherlands, found that only 22% of patients mentioned "not
wanting to be a burden" as a reason for requesting assisted suicide or euthanasia, with only 2%
articulating this as the most important reason. See G. van der Wal et al., Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide. II. Do Dutch Family Doctors Act Prudently?, 9 FAM. PRAC. 135, 138 (1992) (reporting results
of survey indicating reasons why patients sought information about euthanasia from family
doctor).
77. See, e.g., Decisions Near the End of Lif4 supra note 70, at 2332 (discussing risks associated
with allowing physician-performed euthanasia because it creates danger that "physicians and
other health care providers may be more reluctant to invest their energy and time serving
patients whom they believe would benefit from a quick and easy death").
78. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342,406 (Can. 1993) (opinion of Sopinka,
J.); see also id. at 411 (maintaining that purpose of euthanasia legislation is "to discourage
terminally ill from choosing death over life"); cf. Joan Teno & Joanne Lynn, Voluntary Active
Euthanasia: The Individual Case and Public Policy, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 827, 828 (1991):
New patients to hospice often state they want to "get it over with .... " These requests
may be attempts by the patient to see if anyone really cares whether he or she lives.
Meeting such a request with ready acceptance could be disastrous for the patient who
interprets the response as confirmation of his or her worthlessness.
But cf Paul Cotton, Rational Suicide: No Longer 'Crazy'?, 270 JAMA 797, 797 (1993) (noting
argument that providing option of suicide may give patient sense of control, which makes
suicide less likely).
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3. Legalization may taint the relation between patients and doctors
The longstanding prohibition of the Hippocratic Oath that enjoins
physicians not to "give deadly drug to anyone if asked for it, nor
suggest any such counsel" 9 illustrates that the temptations of
euthanasia are not new, and that the associated dangers for the
medical role are not inconsiderable. Before fixing too quickly on this
source, however, we should recall that the Oath's next maxim is "in
like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce an
abortion." °
The popular understanding of the medical role, nonetheless, rests
on a conception of the physician as healer; the patient's acquiescence
in invasive or dangerous treatment rests in part on the faith that the
power the physician exercises is directed toward the patient's recovery.
Many prohibitionists believe that trust would be undermined if
physicians took part in affirmatively hastening their patients' deaths,
even on request.81 Conversely, the prohibition may ease the emo-
tionally difficult task for doctors of engaging with dying patients. As
one proponent of prohibition puts the case:
It may foster a therapeutic intimacy by creating a "landmark" for a
physician in an emotionally disorienting relationship with a dying
patient. If I know I may not project my disquiet back on a patient
by improperly leading him or her to choose suicide, perhaps I will
then dare to create a more intimate clinical relationship in which
I can face more of my discomfort with her suffering. 2
In a medical system in which personal encounters are less common
than ever before,"3 abandoning a medical landmark that fosters
personal trust is a move that carries substantial potential secular costs.
79. Hippocratic Oath, reprinted in THOMAS A. MAPPES & JANE S. ZEMBATY, BIOMEDICAL
ETHics 53 (3d ed. 1991).
80. Hippocratic Oath, quoted in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 112, 131 (1973).
81. E.g., Decisions Near the End ofLife supra note 70, at 2232 (arguing that offering death as
legal medical treatment "might undermine public trust in medicine's dedication to preserving
... life"); William Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill,' 259 JAMA 2139, 2139-40 (1988)
(condemning actions of medical resident for administering fatal dose of painkiller, and calling
for medical community to resist efforts to legalize active euthanasia); David Orentlicher,
Physician Participation inAssisted Suicide, 262JAMA 1844,1844-45 (1989) (arguing that if physician
seems willing to assist in suicide, patient may lose confidence in that physician's commitment
to his or her care); cf. GOMEZ, supra note 57, at 119 (stating that some Dutch nursing homes
advertise publicly that they do not perform euthanasia).
82. Miles, supra note 50, at 1787.
83. See generally Martin L. Cook, The End of Life and the Goals of Medicine, 153 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 2718,2719 (1993) (discussing risk of medicine becoming"mere service industry"
as result of increase in managed care system and increasingly impersonal physician-patient
relationships).
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III. RoE AND BODILY INTEGRITY
The plurality in Casey reached beyond the procreational privacy that
was staked out in Roe' to rest on a "rule (whether mistaken or not)
of personal autonomy and bodily integrity";85 "the mother who
carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical con-
straints, to pain that only she must bear .... Her suffering is too
intimate and personal for the State to insist without more on its own
vision of the woman's role."86 In many of the contexts where
patients seek euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, the "anxiety,
physical constraints and pain" entailed by their physical condition are
often equally incontestable and personal.
One plaintiff in the Washington case, 'Jane Roe," with a life
expectancy of six months, "suffered from cancer which [had] ...
metastasized throughout her skeleton.""7 She experienced constant
pain "which [could] not be fully alleviated by medication."8 She was
"bedridden" and "suffer[ed] from swollen legs, bed sores, poor
appetite, nausea and vomiting, impaired vision, incontinence of the
bowel and general weakness." 9 A second, 'James Poe," "suffer[ed]
from emphysema, which cause[d] him a constant sensation of
suffocating."" In the Canadian case, the plaintiff, Sue Rodriguez,
faced a life expectancy of between two and fourteen months, during
which she would "lose the ability to swallow, speak, walk and move her
84. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-54 (affirming that right of privacy protects activities "relating to
procreation," but holding that this right is not absolute).
85. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992). The plurality goes on to
observe that "our cases since Roe accord with Roe's view that a State's interest in the protection
of life falls short of justifying any plenary override of individual liberty claims." Id. (citing
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1815 (1992); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952);Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)). In each of the cited cases,
the Court sanctioned interference with the rights of bodily autonomy.
86. Id. at 2807; see also id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("One aspect of this liberty is a right to bodily integrity, a right to control one's person ....
'Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to
control men's minds .... ' The same holds true for the power to control women's bodies."
(quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969))); id. at 2846 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("Compelled continuation
of a pregnancy infringes upon a woman's right to bodily integrity by imposing substantial
physical intrusions and significant risks of physical harm .... [R]estrictive abortion laws force
women to endure physical invasions far more substantial than those this Court has held to
violate the constitutional principle of bodily integrity in other contexts.").
87. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1457.
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body without assistance.""1 Rodriguez would "be required to live
until the deterioration from her disease is such that she w[ould] die
as a result of choking, suffocation or pneumonia caused by aspiration
of food or secretions."92
Although current advances in pain management allow palliation of
much physical suffering, an irreducible core of patients are trapped
in physical agony (if they are awake). 9' Many more find their
irreversibly helpless and medically hopeless conditions offensive to
their sense of dignity and meaning.94 A recent proponent of assisted
suicide describes a sixty-seven-year-old retired grandfather suffering
from inoperable, metastatic lung cancer, whose condition, despite
treatment that had resulted in a "relatively good year," had advanced
to the point that he "could no longer tolerate his grandchildren," who
had been his main joy in life:
[H] is days felt empty and his nights were dominated by despair
about the future . ... [H]is severe bone pain required daily
choices between pain and sedation.... Death was becoming less
frightening than life. ... His thigh had crumbled; he could no
longer walk. ... He saw his life savings from 45 years of work
.rapidly depleting .... He wanted to die.
95
The Casey plurality's articulation of an interest in bodily autonomy
rested in part on the Court's discussion two years before in Cruzan v.
91. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 349 (Can. 1993) (Lamer, CJ.C.,
dissenting).
92. Id. at 391 (opinion of Sopinka, J.).
93. Cf. Nancy Volkers, FederalAgency Releases GuidelinesforPain Treatmen 86J. NAT'L CANCER
INsT. 490, 490 (1994) ("No matter the source [of the pain], 'pain . . . can be effectively
controlled in up to 90% of all cancer patients.'" (quoting Phillip R. Lee, Assistant Secretary for
Health, Dep't of Health & Human Services)). See generally Susan D. Bloch & Andrew Billings,
Patient Requests to HastenDeath, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2039 (1994) (discussing studies that
found "uncontrolled pain" as major risk factor for suicide among cancer patients); Gregg A.
Kasting, The Nonnecessity ofEuthanasia, in PH'YSCIAN-ASSisTED DEATH 25, 35 (James Hunter et al.
eds., 1994) (surveying literature suggesting that up to 35% ofterminal patients experience pain).
94. See van der Maas et al., supra note 60, at 672 (reporting results of Dutch survey of
reasons given by those who sought euthanasia or assisted suicide). The survey reported that
57% of those surveyed cited "loss of dignity," 46% cited pain, 46% "unworthy dying," 33% were
concerned about dependency on others, and 23% indicated that they were "tired of life." The
survey emphasized that only 5% of those surveyed mentioned "pain" as the only reason for their
decision to seek either euthanasia or suicide. Id.; see also de Wachter, supra note 60, at 24
(stating that primary reason for requesting aid in dying is unbearable suffering of both physical
and psychological nature); cf. Compassim in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1456 (discussing John Doe,
44-year-old artist dying of AIDS, experiencing chronic severe skin and sinus infections, and
"degenerative disease which will result in blindness and rob him of his ability to paint"); People
v. Kevorkian, 517 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Mich. Ct. App.) (describing assisted suicide of Sherry Miller
who, 16 years after diagnosis with multiple sclerosis, was confined to bed or wheelchair, did not
have use of her legs and right arm, and had difficulty breathing), vacated and remanded, 1994 WL
700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994).
95. Quill, supra note 64, at 871.
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Director, Missouri Department of Health.96  Cruzan, like Quinlan years
earlier, was a "right to die" case regarding the State's standards of
proof for permitting withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from an
incompetent person in a persistent vegetative state. It dealt in passing
with the constitutional rights of a competent patient who seeks to
refuse life-sustaining treatment.
The Court's majority in Cruzan, which included three of the four
dissenters in Casey, "assumed that the United States Constitution
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition."9" Four Cruzan dissenters
wrote strongly in support of that right,9 and Justice O'Connor's
pivotal concurring opinion observed that "our notions of liberty are
inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-
determination,"" and advanced the proposition that "the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects
anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical
treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water."'00
OnlyJustice Scalia unambiguously rejected constitutional protection
of the right to refuse life-saving treatment. 1
The Cruzan discussion was indicative, but less than an explicit
affirmation of a constitutional right to refuse treatment. In Casey,
however, the plurality characterized Roe as a case "recognizing limits
96. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
97. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). The majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and White, also commented
that "the majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who
assists another to commit suicide. We do not think a State is required to remain neutral in the
face of an informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death." Id. at
280.
98. Justice Brennan, writing for himself andJustices Blackmun and Marshall, characterized
the right to be free of unwanted medical treatment "as fundamental, although not necessarily
absolute." Id. at 312 (BrennanJ., dissenting). Justice Brennan's opinion, therefore, left open
the possibility that the interests of a conscious individual, the interests of third parties, or the
interests of society as a whole might be sufficient in some cases to override the individual's
decision.
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens stated:
Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty, and the concomitant
freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our own mortality are undoubtedly
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental, and indeed are essential incidents of the unalienable rights to life and
liberty endowed us by our Creator.
Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quotations and citations omitted). Justice Stevens' dissent,
however, seemed to leave some room for anti-suicide laws or decisions addressing the quality of
life of incompetent but conscious patients. See id. at 347 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
such laws and decisions recognize individuals' interest in living).
99. Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101. See id. at 299-300 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (emphasizing that Due Process Clause neither
explicitly nor through tradition recognizes right to refuse life-saving treatment).
1995] AN ESSAY ON ROE, CASEY, AND THE IGHT TO DIE 833
on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or bar its
rejection" and cited Cruzan as in "accord with Roe's view."1 02  The
plurality illustrated the "soundness" of Roe's implicit recognition of a
right to bodily integrity with a citation to Quinlan's reliance "on Roe
in finding a right to terminate medical treatment."' After Casey,
therefore, it seems that a majority of the Court would not view the
government's interest in preserving the life of a person who seeks to
end her existence as justifying imposition of life-sustaining medical
treatment against a patient's will. The right to bodily integrity, which
was arguably dicta in Cruzan, became a building block in the
plurality's reasoning in Casey.
A number of commentators take this proposition to establish a
constitutionally protected "right to die."104 Indeed, Justice Scalia's
argument against the right to refuse treatment in Cruzan made use of
the supposed entailment of a right to suicide as a point against
constitutionalizing the right to refuse."°5 Although Casey strengthens
this position, ultimately the claim fails."0 6
102. Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992). The plurality carefully went
on to cite Cruzan as a case in "accord with Roe's view that a State's interest in the protection of
life falls short ofjustifying any plenary override of individual liberty claims." Id. Exactly what
"non-plenary" overrides are acceptable is left ambiguous.
103. Id. at 2811; see also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976) (holding that right to
decline medical treatment is analogous to Roe's constitutional right to terminate pregnancy).
104. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions
for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REv. 1139, 1177 (1991) (arguing that consensual active
euthanasia should logically be constitutional right because prohibitions on suicide or assisted
suicide, like forcing unwanted treatment on competent person, may impose undue bodily
burdens); Sedler, supra note 6, at 777, 787-89 (suggesting that under Casey, absolute ban on
physician-prescribed medication used to hasten death would impose undue burden on terminally
ill patient's right to die); Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105
HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2036 (1992) (arguing that competent, terminally ill patient has legal right
to refuse or discontinue life-sustaining treatment); see also Compassion in Dying v. Washington,
850 F. Supp. 1454, 1461 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (questioning distinction between refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide); id. at 1467 (stating that distinction
between removal of life support and assisted suicide violates equal protection because
"distinction between natural and artificial death" does not"justiffy] disparate treatment of [these
two] similarly situated groups"); Hobbins v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487, 496 (Mich. Ct.
App.) (Shelton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If a terminally ill person can
lawfully end her life by disconnecting a life-sustaining machine (Cruzan) why cannot she end
that same life by connecting a life-ending machine?"), affid in part and rev'd in par4 1994 WL
700448 (Mich. Dec. 13, 1994); cf. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 413 (Can.
1993) (CoryJ., dissenting) (stating that right to die should be afforded constitutional protection
because it is integral part of life); id. at 420 (McLachlin,J., dissenting) (commenting that right
to die should be protected against arbitrary state action).
105. See supra note 101 (notingJustice Scalia's view that neither right to suicide nor right to
refuse treatment finds support in constitutional traditions).
106. The Cruzan majority strongly suggested that its holding would not extend to assisted
suicide. See Cruzan, 498 U.S. at 280 (emphasizing that State has strong interest in protecting and
preserving human life, and may impose criminal penalties on those who assist others to commit
suicide). Of course, three of the members of the Cruzan majority dissented from Casey.
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A. The "Right to Refuse" v. the "Right to Control".
Casey's Erosion of the Distinction
Justice O'Connor's pivotal opinion in Cruzan phrases the constitu-
tional right that she would recognize as a right against both "incur-
sions into the body," and "restraint and intrusion." °7 The central
image is the picture of a physician "passing a long flexible tube
through the patient's nose, throat and esophagus and into the
stomach. Because of the discomfort such a tube causes, [m]any
patients need to be restrained forcibly and their hands put into large
mittens."108 This image, however, differs from the plight of Sue
Rodriguez or Washington's Jane Roe. For them, the State's imposi-
tion is not a physical "intrusion" on their bodily integrity but a refusal
to permit lethal intrusions at their own request.
Under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has held
involuntary stomach pumping in the search for evidence and
gratuitous shackles in the effort to treat mental illness to be prohibit-
ed impositions that "shock the conscience of the court."" 9 Yet to
allow a citizen to resist physical intrusions by the State is not to
conclude that the Constitution vests her with plenary control of her
body. A right to refuse invasions by outside forces that bring about
a certain state of affairs is not equivalent to a right to prevent that
state of affairs; it may be only the particular kinds of invasions that are
prohibited. The fact that one can refuse to submit to a stomach
pump to determine the contents of his abdomen does not entail a
right to refuse to submit to a less intrusive X-ray for the same
purpose."1 It is fully consistent to recognize an interest in refusing
the bodily invasion of life-sustaining treatment without recognizing
the different interest in affirmatively acting to end life.' Indeed,
107. Id. at 287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 288-89 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
109. SeeYoungberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding that Due Process Clause
guarantees mentally retarded person right to reasonably nonrestrictive confinement); Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that mandatory stomach pumping violates Due
Process Clause).
110. Cf Schmerberv. California, 384 U.S. 757,770-72 (1966) (holding that involuntary blood
test did not violate Constitution because test was minor intrusion given circumstances).
111. Cf Bernat et al., supra note 44, at 2723, 2724 (arguing that key legal and moral
distinction should be between honoring patient refusals to allow or continue interventions and
patient requests for active treatments by physician). If the studies cited by Bernat are correct
that the refusal of nutrition and hydration are "associated with trivial suffering," and can be
"managed in such a way that the patients remain comfortable," it may be that Cruzan has
established a right to an effective suicide for competent patients, although not to a quick one.
See id. at 2725-26 (citing statistical studies and observations that suggest suffering is minimal
when patient dies from starvation and dehydration); cf. David M. Eddy, A Conversation with My
Mother, 222 JAMA 179 (1994) (providing account of 85-year-old woman's successful suicide by
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the common law right to refuse medically advised treatment, which
supported a claim to historical pedigree of the right in Cruzan,
recognizes no correlative right to demand treatment that is medically
contraindicated."'
This distinction between a right to resist bodily invasion and a right
to demand lethal medical attention establishes a comprehensible line
between the right to refuse treatment and the right to assisted suicide
that tracks the current center of gravity in the medical profession."
3
The distinction, however, is weakened by Casey.
While the "invasion" paradigm govemsJustice O'Connor's opinion
in Cruzan, the right of "personal autonomy and bodily integrity"
explicated in the plurality opinion that Justice O'Connor jointly
authored in Casey is not so easily confined to a right to resist
incursions by the State." 4 In this respect, Casey strengthens the
claim for the right to assisted suicide.
The right to "choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term" imports
a woman's right to exercise affirmative control over her own body, not
merely her right to resist external intrusions. Thus, the Casey plurality
viewed the requirement that women notify their husbands before
obtaining abortions as touching "upon the very bodily integrity of the
refusal of hydration).
112. Cf. Kamisar, supra note 64, at 35 (arguing that Cruzan's recognition of right to terminate
life-sustaining treatment is consistent with rationale of tradition allowing refusal of treatment but
that no similar tradition supports suicide).
This is not to say that a principle protecting a right to control life and death could not also
encompass a right to refuse treatment. But only Justice Stevens seemed to view Cruzan in these
terms. See Cruzan, 487 U.S. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "right to be free from
unwanted life-sustaining treatment [is not] reducible to a protection against batteries
undertaken in the name of treatment .... Choices about death touch the core of liberty...
and indeed are essential incidents of the unalienable rights to life and liberty endowed us by our
Creator.").
113. E.g., Decisions Near the End ofLife supra note 70, at 2233 (advocating physician's duty to
honor patient's request to withhold treatment, but refusing to endorse physician-assisted
suicide); Bernard Gert et al., Distinguishing Between Patients' Refusals and Requests, 24 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1994, at 13, 14 (commenting that distinction between patient's refusal
and request is "of critical importance in understanding distinction between killing and letting
die").
114. Cf Martha A. Field, Pregnancy and AIDS, 52 MD. L. REv. 402, 412 (1993) (stating that
right to make one's own medical decisions involves constitutionally protected interest,
"[w]hether we speak of the right to refuse medical treatment, as in Cruzan, or the right to
obtain it, as in Casey").
In its recent legal discussion on the subject, the New York State Task Force on Life and the
Law rested its conclusion that Cruzan does not countenance a right to assisted suicide on the
proposition that "the imposition of life-sustaining medical treatment against a patient's will
requires a direct invasion of bodily integrity." TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 47,
at 71. The Task Force failed, however, to acknowledge Casey. Additionally, the Task Force
makes the curious assertion that "the Supreme Court has afforded constitutional protection only
to those individual practices 'deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition,'" and cited the
plurality in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989), whose members dissented in
Casey. TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 47, at 72.
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pregnant woman,"" 5 although the requirement constituted no
direct invasion of the woman's body by the State. The Constitution,
according to the Casey plurality, forbids statutes that "place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice" before viability,
not merely those that allow a direct invasion of her body."6
B. Countervailing Interests: Justifications for Limiting Active Euthanasia
After Casey, it is hard to maintain that it is only bodily "invasions"
that draw constitutional scrutiny.11 The autonomy right of the
patient who seeks assistance in ending her life is thus sufficiently
analogous to the right of the patient who refuses life-sustaining
treatment to support a claim that neither interest is subject to a
"plenary override."
But even if this is true, neither right is absolute. State action that
brings about conditions of "anxiety, physical constraint, and pain" is
not inevitably unconstitutional. Just as the concerns of privacy can be
outweighed by the interest in the survival of the viable fetus, the Casey
plurality accepts the proposition that the State's interest in preserving
fetal "life" after viability is a sufficient reason to interfere with a
woman's bodily autonomy."' The constitutional right to choose to
terminate pregnancy with a doctor's assistance similarly does not
entail a right to have the procedure performed by a nonphysician; the
115. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. CL 2791, 2830 (1992).
116. Id. at 2820; see also id. at 2821 (holding that measures aimed at promoting childbirth
over abortion will be invalid if they impose undue burden on woman's choice).
117. The individual interest in refusing treatment may still be more weighty than the interest
in obtaining an abortion because it encompasses both an "invasion" and a "loss of control." See
supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. Just as the preservation of a viable fetus' life may
be sufficient to justify preventing an abortion, yet inadequate to justify a compulsory cesarean
section, the preservation of an adult life may be sufficient to justify prohibiting euthanasia but
inadequate tojustify the imposition of life-sustaining treatment. Cf Doe v. Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326,
334-35 (Ill. App. Ct.) (holding that State's interest in preserving potential life of fetus does not
justify intrusion on woman's body), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1198 (1994).
On the level of the balance of practical harms, moreover, the situation before the Court in
Roe and Casey differed in another dimension. It was clear that the prohibitions struck down in
Roe were widely evaded, but the cost of evasion was the maiming and unnecessary death of
women who sought illegal abortions. Legalization of abortion saved the lives and health of
women who would have violated the law. By contrast, it is hard to make a case that legalization
of assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia would save lives.
118. Indeed, Roe contemplated regulations of abortion in the interest of the "health of the
mother." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973); cf. Casey, 112 S. CL at 2821 ("As with any
medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman
seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on
the right."). The question left open by Casey is whether it is any health regulation that imposes
a substantial obstacle, or only "unnecessary" health regulations, that violate the Constitution.
If only "unnecessary" regulations are prohibited, logically there may be situations where the
woman's right to choose may be infringed against her will in the interests of her own health.
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woman's interest in unfettered choice is outweighed by other
legitimate State concerns." 9
A right to refuse life-sustaining treatment does not establish a right
to assistance in ending life if the State's interests in avoiding voluntary
suicide and euthanasia are more powerful than its interest in
mandating unwanted medical interventions. Two sets of State
interests serve to distinguish assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia
from the right to refuse treatment: moral interests and practical
interests.
1. Moral interests: killing and letting die
Although the patient does not object, and indeed seeks death in
both a refusal of treatment and a request for lethal assistance, the
State may have a legitimate basis for morally distinguishing the act of
the doctor who removes life support from that of the doctor who
provides a lethal injection not because the rights of the patient differ,
but because of distinctions in the doctor's culpability. The State may
judge that the injection is more culpable, not because it violates the
"rights" of the patient, but because the direct, active, and intentional
killing of a human being is intrinsically more blameworthy morally.
The argument is that although there is a protectable interest in
affirmatively controlling one's body in both situations, the constitu-
tional right of bodily autonomy is overcome in the case of "active" but
not "passive" voluntary euthanasia by the greater moral culpability of
the former.'2 °
A moral distinction between "active" and "passive" euthanasia is
widely recognized among the medical profession.121  Doctors who
119. See Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975) (per curiam) (holding that
prosecuting nonphysicians who perform abortions does not infringe woman's privacy interests);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973) (permitting States to proscribe abortions by
nonphysicians because of interest in preserving health and life of mother). But see Benten v.
Kessler, 112 S. Ct. 2929, 2930-31 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of application to
vacate stay) (stating that right to choose to terminate pregnancy entails right to use
nonapproved drug in order to induce nonsurgical abortion when no significant health risk
exists).
120. The author of a Harvard Law Review Note concerning physician-assisted suicide ignores
this possibility and maintains that, because the terminally ill and medically dependent patient
has a right to die by refusing treatment, the State's interest is no greater in avoiding death by
poison. Note, supra note 104, at 2036.
121. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 61 (1983) (stating
that distinction between "acting" and "omitting to act" is one factor to determine whether
medical decision is morally and legally acceptable); ROBERT F. WEIR, ABATING TREATMENT WITH
CRITICALLY ILL PATIENTS: ETHICAL AND LEGAL LIMITATIONS TO THE MEDICAL PROLONGATION OF
LIFE 306-07 (1989) (agreeing that "reasonable line can be drawn both conceptually and morally
between treatment abatement and euthanasia"); American Geriatrics Society, Public Policy
Committee, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 39J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 826, 826 (1991) (stating that
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would not think of lethally injecting their patients draw what they
regard as a substantial moral distinction between that act and the
removal of life support. Those who recognize the distinction between
"active" and "passive" euthanasia view their opponents as obtuse to the
point of moral myopia.'22
The distinction is not alien to the law. The distinction in culpabili-
ty between directly and actively causing harm and merely allowing it
to happen is embedded in criminal jurisprudence'2 3  and tort
law.'24 Indeed the distinction between passively allowing a result to
come about and actively promoting it is well-established in the
Supreme Court's state action jurisprudence." Justice Scalia's claim
in Cruzan that there is no difference between suicide and refusal of
life support rests uncomfortably with a series of cases in which he
physicians should not provide treatment that "actively, directly, and intentionally" causes
patient's death); Dan W. Brock, Voluntary ActiveEuthanasia, 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr.
1992, at 10, 10 (observing that debate between voluntary active euthanasia and passive physician-
assisted suicide has become prominent issue in biomedical ethics); Gillett, supra note 75, at 313,
326 (arguing for continued recognition of distinction between killing and letting die, and for
"common rejection of active euthanasia by health professionals"); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Doctors
Must Not Kill, 3 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 95, 95 (1992) (defining active euthanasia as "intentional
killing of a patient by a physician with the patient's consent," and passive euthanasia as "allowing
a patient with an incurable disease to die either by withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
support"). But seeJAMES RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE 106-14 (1986) (attacking traditional medical
distinction between killing and letting die, and arguing for equivalence theory-that there exists
no moral difference between two).
Although acknowledging some logical problems with the distinction between killing and
letting die, Tom L. Beauchamp andjames F. Childress, scholars from the Kennedy Institute of
Ethics, formerly took the position that the distinction served valuable social functions, and that
medical killing should, in accordance with traditional medical ethics, be prohibited. TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP &JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 134-47 (3d ed. 1989). In
the fourth edition of their book, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress reverse
field and argue that passive and active voluntary euthanasia are not morally distinguishable, TOM
L BEAUCHAMP &JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 219-41 (4th ed. 1994),
and that "in general, we have thus far been able to respect the line between unjustifiable and
justifiable passive euthanasia in medical practice, and we should similarly be able to hold the
line between justified and unjustified assistance for suicide," id. at 240.
122. See, e.g., DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE 76 (1993) ("There is and will
always remain a fundamental difference between what nature does to us and what we do to one
another."); Daniel Callahan, When SelfDetermination Runs Amok 22 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar..
Apr. 1992, at 52, 53 (contending that "notion that there is no morally significant difference
between omission and commission is just wrong").
123. See, e.g., DOUcLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAWv 83 (1987); LEO KATZ, BAD
AcTs AND GUIL' MINDS 140-43 (1987); F.M. Kamm, Action, Omission and the Stringency of Duties,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1493, 1495 (1994); Michael S. Moore, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L.
REv. 1749, 1772-88 (1994). Not all commentators hold omissions wholly blameless, but most
view the culpability as different in scope. Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1985) (positing that
liability cannot be based on omission unless duty is specifically imposed by law).
124. See W.P. KEETON Er AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 373-74 (5th ed.
1984) (distinguishing nonfeasance from malfeasance in tort law).
125. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1989)
(arguing that Framer's intent and past cases support proposition that Due Process Clause
protects individuals from "affirmative" state action, and does not impose liability for inaction
absent statute or special relationship between individual and State).
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concurred that absolved the State from responsibility for bodily
violations that it passively allowed to occur.26
Yet, the pervasive dissatisfaction with the Court's state action
jurisprudence suggests that the active/passive distinction is, at best,
problematic. And the opponents of the distinction in the "right to
die" field view its partisans as obscurantist to the point of pedant-
ry.127
The constitutional question is whether control of a citizen's body,
dignity, and pain can be limited on such debated moral premises.
The guidance of precedent is weak, because the cases that affirm the
State's power to act from contested moral conviction, for the most
part, do not involve suffering of a magnitude comparable to that
imposed on Sue Rodriguez or Washington's Jane Roe.1 28 The
earlier argument that the abortion cases can be read to bar the State
from imposing substantial, concrete, concentrated disadvantage on
126. E.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 1069-70 (1992) (holding that
municipality did not have affirmative duty under Due Process Clause to warn decedent about
unsafe working conditions that caused his death); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-96 (holding that Due
Process Clause does not impose affirmative duty on State to protect individuals from private
actor's criminal activity); cf. Louis M. Seidman, Confusion at theBorder. Cruzan, "The Right toDie"
and the Public/Pivate Distinction, 1991 Sup. Cr. REv. 47, 67-68 (observing that Justice Scalia's
critique on "action/inaction distinction" in Cruzan implies State liability for "fatal nonfeasance").
It is only by abandoning this distinction that a court could recognize the claim of the plaintiffs
in Lee v. Oregon that legalizing assisted suicide deprives them of their "right to life" without due
process. Lee Complaint, supra note 13, at 30.
Any attack on the "action/inaction" distinction leads to curious reversals. Justice Scalia in
Cruzan takes the position that there is no compelling difference between refusing treatment and
committing suicide. But if this is so, then it would seem that the failure to allow assistance is
equivalent to trapping Sue Rodriguez in an endless cycle of torture, and allowing Joshua
DeShaney to be murdered is equivalent to murdering him. If the same act/omission principles
are applicable at both individual and societal levels (and this is a big if), it suggests that a
consistent position must draw a distinction between suicide and refusals of treatment or
abandon the proposition that the State is not responsible for harms it allows to occur.
127. E.g., RACHELS; supra note 121, at 119-21 (statirg that active/passive distinction has no
basis in physicians' professional conduct); Leslie Bender, A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted
Dying and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 59 TENN. L. REV. 519, 531 (1992) ("It is unseemly for the
legal system's analysis to turn on whether the physician's role was active or passive ....");
Radish, supra note 10, at 864-65 (questioning application of act/omission distinction in "right-to-
die situations," and arguing that such application is "suspect" and "eccentric at best"); James
Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975) (criticizing American
Medical Association's policy statement against active euthanasia); Note, supra note 104, at 2029
(arguing that no inherent distinctions exist between letting patient die and assisting patient's
death because both are included in patient's "single undivided interest in controlling what
happens to her own body").
128. Cf Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (allowing state's public
indecency statute to require nude dancers to wear "pasties" and "G-strings"); Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (upholding State's right to ban
religious use of peyote); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (permitting State to
criminalize consensual sodomy); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (allowing
State to regulate obscene material in places of public accommodation); Lottery Case, 188 U.S.
321, 363 (1903) (permitting government to restrict transportation of lottery tickets from one
state to another).
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the basis of morally contested premises counts against the moral
argument, although in weakened form, because here the morally
contested principle is being deployed as an exemption rather than a
basis for limiting action, and the doctor's action is not one that
"defines the attributes of personhood."
A thought experiment suggests that moralism can warrant even
quite substantial impositions. Federal law prohibits the sale of human
organs for transplant 9 based, in part, on the widely held, but not
universal, moral revulsion toward the commodification of human
body parts."' 0 Imagine a willing kidney seller and a dying kidney
buyer approaching the court. The seller claims that the prohibition
infringes on the right of the seller to control her own kidney; the
buyer claims an infringement of the right to control her body by
avoiding death. It is hard to picture a court striking the statute, down
as violative of the Constitution.
2. Practical interests
a. Mistake, abuse, and the interests of others
Even if the moral difference between active and passive euthanasia
is insufficient to justify distinguishing voluntary euthanasia from
refusal of life-sustaining treatment, there are weighty practical
differences between the two practices in terms of the dangers they
pose to the lives and welfare of persons other than the patient before
the court. Cruzan held that the State's interest in "guarding against
potential abuses" in the removal of life-sustaining treatment allowed
Missouri to weight the scales against cessation of treatment by
requiring hydration and nutrition of Nancy Cruzan in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence of her wishes to refuse treatment.131
If the dangers of abuse were sufficiently greater, presumably the
Court's reasoning would enable the State to prohibit the practice
entirely. I have canvassed above3 2 the dangers of mistake, abuse,
129. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988).
130. See Organ Transplants: Hearings Bffore the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 356, 357 (1983) (statement of Dr.
James F. Childress, professor of religious studies and medical education) (observing that sale
and purchase of organs poses serious ethical issues for society). A number of state statutes also
forbid organ sales. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f(a) (West 1988) (barring acquisition, sale,
promotion, or transfer of any human organ for valuable consideration); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720,
para. 5/12-20(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (classifying sale or purchase of body parts as Class A
misdemeanor for first conviction and Class 4 felony for subsequent convictions); MD. CODE ANN.
HEALTH-GEN. § 5408(a) (1994) (prohibiting sale or purchase of body or body part).
131. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284-85 (1990).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 48-83.
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and corrosion of medical relationships that extend the argument
against assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia beyond an un-
adorned claim regarding the sanctity of human life. These arguments
suffice to rebut the claim that the prohibitionists are attempting to
engage in a "plenary override" of bodily autonomy.
To be sure, each of the dangers of mistake or abuse attributed to
the prospect of voluntary active euthanasia has a counterpart in
specters that can be raised regarding the right to refuse life-saving
treatment.13 3  But a right to refuse treatment puts at risk only the
lives of those who would die without treatment. While this is a
considerable number of people, the approval of active euthanasia or
assisted suicide would extend the risk to the entire population.
Particularly with the emergence of cost controls and managed care in
the United States, the danger of tempting health care providers to
persuade chronic patients to minimize costs by ending it all painlessly
is no fantasy.13 ' The quantitative distinction between some and all
can be a legitimate predicate for the qualitative distinction between
permission and prohibition.
13 5
133. For example, Daniel Callahan argued that a failure to retain a prohibition on cessation
of feeding put at risk the obligation to care for the poor. Daniel Callahan, On Feeding thelDying,
13 HAST NGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 22. More recently, commentators have suggested that
both advance directives by patients declining expensive life-sustaining treatment and do-not-
resuscitate orders may be effective cost reduction measures. E.g., Christopher V. Chambers et
al., Relationship of Advance Directives to Hospital Charges in a Medicare Population, 154 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 541, 541 (1994) (finding that mean charges for patients without advance
directives were more than three times mean charges of patients with advance directives, and
concluding that "enormous cost savings to society may accrue if discussions take place"); see
DonaldJ. Murphy et al., New Do-Not-Resuscitate Policies: A First Step in Cost Control 153 ARCHIVES
INTERNALMED. 1641,1641-43 (1993) (arguing that do-not-resuscitate policies should be imposed
upon patients with poor prognosis after cardiopulmonary resuscitation as means of cost savings);
see also People v. Kevorkian, Nos. 99591, 99674, 99752, 99758, 99759, 1994 WL 700448, at *26
(Mich. Dec. 13, 1994) (Levin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The legitimate
concerns about involuntary euthanasia apply with at least as much force to the withdrawal of life
support.").
134. The New York Task Force on Life and the Law points out that denial of a right of
refusal "might deter individuals from seeking medical treatment in the first place." TASK FORCE
ON LiFE AND THE LAw, supra note 47, at 75. Denial of assisted suicide might have some of the
same effects, diluting the State's interest in prohibiting refusals of treatment as a way of
sustaining life.
135. The Dutch experience, in fact, has been that withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
accounts for 17.5% of deaths, while euthanasia and assisted suicide account for only 2.3% of
deaths, van der Maas et al., supra note 60, at 671. However, under the Dutch system of medical
care, which provides free and comprehensive care, Dutch doctors are paid on the basis of the
number of patients and procedures. Zbigniew Zylicz, The Story Behind the Blank Spo, 10 AM. J.
HOSPICE PALLIATIVE CARE, July-Aug. 1993, at 30, 31. This system furnishes substantially less
incentives to end costs by ending life than the emerging capitated system in the United States.
Moreover, euthanasia in the Netherlands is administered predominantly by family physicians
who have personal relationships with their patients. See de Wachter, supra note 60, at 24 (stating
that relationship between patient and family doctor in Dutch society is strong due to emphasis
on continuity of care and readily available nursing and domestic care). Because of the current
health care system, such physicians are not available to large segments of the American
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b. Fair allocation of burdens: of scapegoats and sacrifices
The consequentialist arguments for prohibition for the most part
do not rest on issues about the welfare of the patient before the
court. Rather they rely on the risks of abuse and mistake in other
cases, and the importance of providing support for life-preserving
choices elsewhere. In prohibiting assisted suicide and euthanasia, the
State is choosing to protect the welfare of others at the cost of the
plaintiff's control over her own body. This sacrifice of the dignity and
pain of one innocent citizen for the benefit of others raises moral
difficulties. As one Canadian Supreme CourtJustice put the matter:
The argument is essentially this. There may be no reason on the
facts of Sue Rodriguez's case for denying to her the choice to end
her life.. . . Nevertheless, she must be denied that choice because
of the danger that other people may wrongfully abuse the power
they have over the weak and ill, and may end the lives of these
persons against their consent. Thus, Sue Rodriguez is asked to bear
the burden of the chance that other people in other situations may
act criminally to kill others or improperly sway them to suicide.
She is asked to serve as a scapegoat.
136
The choice presented to the court is not between the bodily welfare
of one individual and another, but rather between the concrete
suffering of a real person and the hypothetical welfare of an
undefined class who may or may not find themselves at risk. As
Canadian Chief Justice Lamer put the matter, "The truth is that we
simply do not and cannot know the range of implications that
allowing some form of assisted suicide will have for persons with
physical disabilities. What we do know and cannot ignore is the
population. See David W. Baker et al., RegularSource ofAmbulatorj Care and Medical Care Utilization
by Patients Presenting to a Public Hospital Emergency Department, 271JAMA 1909, 1919,1910 tbl. 1
(1994) (reporting that in study of 1190 patients presenting to emergency room, 28% had no
regular source of medical care, and 16% used emergency rooms as regular sources of medical
care); Medicaid Access Study Group, Access of Medicaid Patients to Outpatient Care, 330 NE W ENG.
J. MED. 1426, 1427-28 (1994) (reporting that Medicaid patients have difficulty finding primary
care physicians); Erik Olson, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room, 46
STAN. L REV. 449, 451-52, 464-65 (1994) (articulating concerns that emergency rooms provide
substantial portion of primary care for uninsured individuals, and often provide inadequate
attention); Kimberly J. Rask et al., Obstacles Predicting Lack of a Regular Provider and Delays in
Seeking Care for Patients at an Urban Public Hospita 271 JAMA 1931, 1931 (1994) (reporting that
in study of 3897 patients seeking care at urban public hospital, 61.6% reported no regular
sources of care); Sidney D. Watson, Health Care in the Inner City, Asking the Right Question, 71 N.C.
L REV. 1648, 1649 (1993) (noting that office based primary care physicians are disappearing in
poor urban areas, and inner city residents rely on shrinking bases of emergency rooms and
public clinics for primary care).
136. Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.LR4th 342, 417-18 (Can. 1993) (McLachlinJ.,
dissenting).
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anguish of those in the position of Ms. Rodriguez."137 Can the State
impose continued anguish upon some in order to avoid risk to others
without transgressing constitutional limits?
It is clear under the general constraints of substantive due process
that relatively minor intrusions on the bodies of innocent citizens are
constitutionally acceptable in the service of substantial public ends.
Individuals are regularly required in minor ways to be "sacrificed" for
public ends. For example, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,"3 8 the Court
recognized the right of a State to require smallpox vaccination to
preserve the health of the community despite objections under the
Due Process Clause." 9  In Schmerber v. California,"° the Court held
that the State's power to demand blood samples of allegedly drunk
drivers did not violate the Fourth Amendment."'
More extensive impositions can also be justified to achieve
comparably more weighty gains to bodily security of others or public
welfare. Whalen v. Roe 42 affirmed the power of New York to require
centralized reporting of controlled substance prescriptions despite a
showing that the reporting requirement would "unquestionably"
induce some individuals "to avoid or to postpone needed medical
attention."'43  Similarly, United States v. Rutherford" upheld the
prohibition of Laetrile against a challenge by a class of terminally ill
cancer patients who desired to use the unapproved drug for treatment
of their disease. 45 Despite the fact that the drug was harmless, and
although the patients were informed and eager to make use of it, the
Court upheld the ban on the ground that "if an individual suffering
from a potentially fatal disease rejects conventional therapy in favor
of a drug with no demonstrable curative properties, the consequences
137. Id. at 376 (Lamer, C.J.C., dissenting).
138. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
139. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38-39 (1905).
140. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
141. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). In Jacobson there is some argument
that the vaccination is necessary to prevent the citizen himself from doing harm to others. This
is a bit strained, as the "harm" would come in the form of involuntarily becoming the carrier
of smallpox. The drunk driving suspect in Schmerber, the potential drug users in Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977) and United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979), like the potential
draftee, represent no direct threat to the public health.
142. 429 U.S. 589 (1977); see i. at 603 (stating that even if use of certain dangerous drugs
were completely forbidden by State, no violation of Fourteenth Amendment would have
occurred); cf. Minnesota ex rl. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921) (upholding
regulation of morphine).
143. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 589, 603-04 (holding that effects of such reporting requirements for
dangerous but legitimate drugs on patient's reputation or independence was insufficient to
violate Fourteenth Amendment).
144. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
145. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 553-58.
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can be irreversible." 46  The Constitution does not prohibit the
imposition of involuntary military service,' 47 though the conscript
risks his life, and Justice Holmes viewed that imposition as precedent
for imposition on the bodies of civilians.'48
Under more specific strictures of the Fourth Amendment, "[w] here
the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is
not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly
force." 149 For less serious assaults, the issue is whether the officer's
146. Id. at 556. Although the Supreme Court declined to reach the constitutional issue, the
Tenth Circuit on remand rejected a constitutional challenge out of hand by finding that
"selection of a particular treatment, or at least a medication is within the area of government
interest in protecting public health." Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455,457 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980); see also Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir.
1980) (noting that individual's privacy and liberty rights, although protected by Constitution,
do not enable them to ignore valid acts of police power governing acquisition of laetrile);
People v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 925-26 (Cal.) (holding that state prohibition on sale and
prescription of unapproved drug, laetrile, did not violate right of privacy protected by
Constitution because it was reasonably related to concerns of health and safety), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 949, and cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
The Court's decision in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992), does not
foreclose a claim that the Constitution bars sacrifice of personal safety for public welfare, but
it is hardly strong support. Narrowly read, Collins rejects a claim that a city's deliberate
indifference to the safety of its employees violates the Constitution. Id. at 1069. The Court in
Collins read the complaint to exclude claims that the city had "deliberately harmed" the
decedent, or that it "knew or should have known that there was a significant risk" of harm, id.,
and implicitly acknowledged that a government action may violate the Due Process Clause
because it is "arbitrary" or "conscience shocking," id. at 1070. On the other hand, the Court
emphasized its reluctance "to expand the concept of substantive due process." Id. at 1068. "Our
refusal to characterize the city's alleged omission in this case as arbitrary in a constitutional sense
rests on the presumption that the administration of Government programs is based on a rational
decisionmaking process that takes account of competing social, political and economic forces."
Id. at 1070. The implication is that competing "social, political, and economic forces" can
legitimately allocate lethal risks..
147. See Selective Service Draft Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 381, 387-89 (1918) (noting that when
Constitution was adopted, power of Congress to form army by using state quotas was recognized,
and holding that "supreme and noble duty of contributing to the rights and honor of the
nation" did not violate prohibition against involuntary servitude).
148. SeeBuck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (holding that order to sterilize patient of State
Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded did not violate Fourteenth Amendment, and noting
that "[w]e have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for
their lives.... The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover
cutting the Fallopian tubes.").
"[G]iven the requirements of the prison environment," the Court has upheld a policy
permitting involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs, despite the possibility of serious
side effects, to a convicted prisoner "who has a serious mental illness" and "is dangerous to
himself or others," where "the treatment is in [his] medical interest." Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 226-33 (1990). The Court has also suggested in dictum that similar administration
would be appropriate in the case of prisoners awaiting trial if it was "essential for the sake of
[the prisoner's] own safety or the safety of others," or necessary to allow a prisoner to stand trial.
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1815 (1992); ef. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319
(1982) (holding that person's "liberty interests require State to provide [mentally retarded who
are involuntarily committed to its institutions] minimally adequate or reasonable training to
ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint").
149. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
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action is that "of a reasonable officer on the scene," taking into
account "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or to others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight."'150 Bodily intrusions in search of evidence are permissible
where they are not "unreasonable," weighing the "magnitude of the
intrusion" against the "community's interest in fairly and accurately
determining guilt or innocence."
151
Still, the Constitution does place outer limits on the right of the
State to impose on the bodies of its citizens where the impositions are
grave. The Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts acknowledged that a
different result could be required if vaccination of an individual
would be "cruel and inhuman," or would "seriously impair his
health." '152 The Due Process Clause prohibits bodily impositions
that "shock[] the conscience" of the court; the police cannot pump
the stomach of a criminal suspect to recover swallowed capsules
53
and the government cannot inflict needless suffering "contrary to
contemporary standards of decency."154 The prohibition on "unrea-
150. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
151. Compare Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759, 761-62 (1985) (holding unconstitutional
order requiring surgery to recover bullet in suspect's chest) with Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (upholding compulsory blood tests for drunk driving, which "involve [d]
virtually no risk, trauma, or pain" and were "highly effective means of determining"
intoxication).
152. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).
153. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
154. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2480 (1993). The Eighth Amendment prohibits
state officials from denying prisoners their "basic human needs, one of which is 'reasonable
safety,'" id. at 2481, or subjecting prisoners to a "substantial risk of serious harm" coupled with
"'deliberate indifference' to inmate health and safety," Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977,
on remand, 28 F.3d 1216 (7th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Amendment further prohibits denial of
medical treatment for "serious medical needs" because such denial may inflict "pain and
suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose." Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1992) (noting that
prisoner's medical needs must be "serious" to satisfy deliberate indifference standard necessary
to show violation of Eight Amendment). Presumably rights of the unincarcerated against
imposition of harm cannot be less than those of inmates. Cf Revere v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (noting that due process rights of person who is hurt during
his arrest should be "at least as great as Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted
prisoner"); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (stating that due process rights that
protect inmates from bodily restraint must also apply to those who are involuntarily confined);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,535-36 & nn.16-17 (1979) (noting that, under Eighth Amendment,
inmate's punishment may not be "cruel and unusual," but that due process rights of pretrial
detainee mandate that he not be punished at all).
The Court has held that Estelle imposed no duty to protect from danger those citizens who
are not in State custody because the State "played no part in [the danger's] creation, nor did
it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to [the danger]," and imposed no limitation
on his "freedom to act on his own behalf." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-01 (1989). Where the State actively interferes with a citizen's freedom
of action (as in the prohibition on assisted suicide), and that interference makes the citizen
"vulnerable" to physical suffering, the State's action must at least be judged by the standards that
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sonable searches and seizures" 55 precludes disproportionately
intrusive law enforcement activities; police cannot use either deadly
force to capture nonviolent offenders or "objectively unreasonable"
force against any citizen.' 6  The interest in obtaining moderately
relevant trial evidence cannot justify involuntary surgery. 5 And at
leastJustice O'Connor believes that involuntary medical experiments
upon unconsenting soldiers for the purpose of simply gathering
information, though undertaken for the military benefit of the nation
at large, are constitutional violations of the first order.'58
All of these limitations are explicable under a rubric of proportion-
ality, and it is precisely the fact that the evil of the deaths of the
victims of mistake and abuse is of the same potential level of
importance as the suffering of those who seek euthanasia that makes
the choice morally problematic.'59 Sue Rodriguez in Canada and
Jane Roe in Washington are not being required to sacrifice their
suffering on the altar of an ephemeral public goal. Neither are their
plights at odds with established contemporary standards of decen-
constrain it in punishing convicted prisoners.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
156. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 397 (1989) (noting that correct standard
governing claims of excessive force in effecting "arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of
... person" is "objective reasonableness" found in Fourth Amendment); Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (noting that state statute that allowed use of deadly force in order to
prevent suspected felon from escaping violated Fourteenth Amendment).
157. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985) (holding that order requiring suspect to
undergo surgery to recover bullet in his chest was unconstitutional).
158. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 709 (1987) (O'Connor,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The Government contended that its officers and agents administered LSD
to 1000 soldiers, in addition to Respondent, "for the purpose of 'ascertain[ing] the effects of
the drug on their ability to function as soldiers' and 'to evaluate the validity of the traditional
security training... in the face of unconventional, drug enhanced interrogations.'" Brief for
United States at 3 n.1, United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (No. 86-393) (citation
omitted); see also Stanley, 483 U.S. at 695-96 n.14 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("[T]he standards that the Nuremberg Military Tribunals developed to judge the
behavior of the defendants stated that 'voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential ... to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts.'"); id. at 710 (O'ConnorJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (stating that due process rights guarantee that if Nuremberg Trial
standard is not met, society must at least require perpetrators to compensate victims).
159. There are, of course, imponderables on both sides of the balance. No one really knows
either how many nonvoluntary deaths would occur, or how many vulnerable people would be
pressured to seek assisted suicide if the prohibition were eliminated, or how many sufferers
would benefit. The procedural protections of a narrowly drawn assisted suicide statute could
reduce the risk of erroneous deaths and dilute the incentives for abuse. On the other hand,
in many cases, physical suffering can be alleviated by means short of death, and medical
assistance is not required for suicide.
Leaving numbers aside, in choosing between suffering for some and death for others it is
possible that avoiding death may be the more important priority. At the current level of
knowledge, a State can legitimately judge that the risk of death avoided by the prohibition is
commensurable with the suffering imposed.
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Yet there is another class of cases that seems to establish a separate
constitutional limitation on imposition of substantial bodily intrusion
that cannot be outweighed by a proportional gain to others. The
paradigm is an issue that has never reached the Supreme Court
directly, but that has regularly occupied criminal law scholars and
bioethicists: May the State require a citizen to donate a nonessential
body part to save the life of another? The consensus is that it may
not, even if the risk to the donor is minimal and the invasion is
necessary to save the life of a concrete human being.'6 1 The fact
that a lobe of my liver, or one of my kidneys, or even my renewable
bone marrow could save my neighbor's life does not license the State
to extract those items against my will. Similarly, while Roe and Casey
both allow the State to prohibit abortions of viable fetuses, they make
exceptions for abortions that seek to preserve the health of the
mother.6 ' An intervening abortion case held that a State may not
require a trade-off between an increased risk to the woman's health
and an increased chance of fetal survival; the woman's health is
160. Although the desire to torture a witness in order to require her to divulge the location
of a hidden terrorist bomb endangering a larger number of victims would not violate norms of
proportionality, I would still expect such actions to be held unconstitutional. Cf. Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (condemning stomach pumping to produce evidence of
possession of "preparation of morphine" as "too close to the rack and thumb-screw").
The difference between that situation and Rodriguez is twofold. First, the direct imposition
of suffering by the State seems more at odds with decency than the refusal to allow termination
of suffering. This is not, however, a bright line distinction. For example, it is conceivable that
a State's refusal to allow a witness to drink water could be classified as both a direct imposition
and a refusal to end suffering. Second, the historical prohibition and contemporary revulsion
toward torture is better grounds for a claim of violating "contemporary standards of decency"
than the controversial claim that suicide to end suffering is a moral right.
161. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 92 (1978), is the only case in which that issue has
been directly addressed. Cf Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1331 (IIl. 1990) (refusing to
require marrow transplant from minor where transplant was not in child's best interests); In re
Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Wis. 1975) (refusing to require kidney
donation by incompetent where incompetent did not consent and transplant was not in his best
interests). But cf Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (authorizing kidney
transplant from mentally incompetent 28-year-old to his brother under substituted judgment
rule). On the parallel issue of cesarian sections, compare In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (refusing to order cesarean section and expressing "doubt that there could ever be
a situation extraordinary or compelling enough to justify a... [cesarean] section [I against that
person's will") and In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (refusing to
order cesarean section to save child's life, and reading Roe and Casey to preclude those intrusions
for benefit of fetus that endanger woman's health) with Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County
Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981) (per curiam) (upholding court-order cesarean that
would preserve life of viable fetus) and In re Madyun Fetus, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2233, 2240
(D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986) (noting that hospital can perform cesarean section over
objections of mother when risks to fetus are significant and those to mother are minimal).
162. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2821-22 (1992) (noting that "essential
holding of Roe forbids a state from interfering with a woman's choice to undergo an abortion
procedure if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her health"); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
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constitutionally paramount.'63 In view of these cases, one might ask
how the State can, in the even more diffuse interest of saving the lives
of an unknown set of potential victims of abuse or mistake, and of
engendering the patients' trust in the medical profession, be allowed
to trap Ms. Rodriguez in a life of what she regards as unbearable
suffering.
The answer comes in reconciling the "transplant" and "no trade-off"
cases with cases that allow the State, in the interest of public welfare
and safety, to impinge substantially upon the bodily integrity of
individual citizens. When the police shoot a fleeing suspect in a
violent felony, seek a blood sample from a suspected drunk driver, or
enforce a prohibition against the unregistered prescription of drugs,
the protection that they afford is to the public at large, rather than to
any individual citizen. The authorities have not chosen the safety of
any other individual as paramount to that of the suspect or patient;
rather, they vindicate an impersonal aggregate interest. By contrast,
a compelled bone marrow transplant makes the donor's body a means
to the survival of some other individual; the State has said, in effect,
that it values one citizen more than the other. The State may
conscript its citizens to serve in the public interest, but it may not
conscript them to serve one another.'
4
The prohibition of assisted suicide is not a direct reallocation of
rights from one citizen to another; it is a tragic sacrifice of the
suffering of one for the aggregate good of the whole.
163. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768-69
(1986) (affirming court of appeals' determination that such "trade-off" was unconstitutional).
164. This may sound like a resurrection of the "public use" requirement of the Takings
Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation"), or the "public purpose" requirement of substantive due process, see, e.g.,
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55,80 (1937) (requiring that, when private
property is taken, there must be, in addition to compensation, "public purpose" to justify
taking). It is.
My embarrassment in invoking this device is mitigated by three facts. First, I can see no other
way of rieconciling the bone-marrow and fleeing-felon intuitions. Second, while property is
protected only against takings without compensation, physical autonomy is protected by the
absolute prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, which completely disallows the existence
of "slavery or involuntary servitude except as punishment for crime." The decline of the public
use requirement in the property area does not necessarily undercut its propriety in the area of
bodily autonomy. Indeed, it was precisely the fact that the citizen was required to contribute
to the public purpose of "the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a
war declared by the great representative body of the people" which overcame Thirteenth
Amendment objections in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918). Finally, it
seems more plausible to claim that the body is a pre-political entitlement than property, because
property is a creation of the State.
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IV. EQUALITY AND THE "RIGHT TO CHOOSE"
The argument for a constitutional right of women to choose an
abortion is incomplete unless we recognize precisely that it is choice
for women that is at issue. Requiring women to bear unwanted
children threatens to lock them into a traditional and subordinate
role, embodies assumptions about their inability to make autonomous
moral choices, and burdens women as a group with obligations that
have no counterpart in the burdens that the State demands from
men. A broad spectrum of scholars have viewed the argument from
an equality standpoint as a crucial. building block in the defense of
abortion rights.16 Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Casey explicit-
ly adopted this theme,166 the joint plurality opinion played it in an
undertone,16 7 and Justice Ginsburg in her prior scholarly incarna-
tion suggested that it is the principle of women's equality that
provides the firmest grounding for the right to reproductive choice.166
165. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 270-85 (noting that, by
using equality argument, one can "acknowledge[] the possibility that fetuses are in important
respects human beings" and still assert that abortions must be prohibited); TRIBE, CLASH OF
ABSOLUTES, supra note 16, at 105 (stating that, without access to abortions, women suffer
substantial burden in their ability to participate equally in society); Estrich & Sullivan, supra note
16, at 151 (noting that prohibition of abortions directly affects only women); Ginsburg, supra
note 16, at 383 (noting that abortion controversy includes woman's "ability to stand in relation
to man, society, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen"); Karst, supra
note 16, at 58 (stating that control over one's reproductive rights means control over one's
future); Law, supra note 16, at 1009 (stating that issue of equality is raised when laws
differentiate based on biological characteristics); MacKinnon, supra note 16, at 1308-24 (noting
that "any forced pregnancy will always deprive and hurt one sex only as member of her
gender"); Regan, supra note 16, at 1571 (viewing abortion controversy in context of samaritan
laws); Siegel, supra note 16, at 353 (stating that laws restricting abortions are inconsistent with
constitutional principle of equal protection); Strauss, supra note 16, at 18-22 (noting that if
abortion question is left to political process, result may well be subordination of women);
Sunstein, Neutrality, supra note 16, at 31-44 (arguing, inter alia, that prohibitions on abortions are
form of sexual discrimination and are derived from stereotypes that run counter to constitution-
al principles); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS ATrITUDES AND THE LAW 101 (1985) ("For me,
the essence of the argument in favor of abortion is an equality argument.").
166. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (Blackmun,J., concurring) ("The assumption-that women
can simply be forced to accept the 'natural' status and incidents of motherhood-appears to rest
upon a conception of women's role that has triggered the protection of the Equal Protection
Clause.").
167. See id. at 2807 ("Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been
in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a
large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society."). The
joint opinion acknowledged that women's control over their reproductive systems has facilitated
gender equality in economic and social spheres, id. at 2809, and struck down the husband
notification requirement as resting on views of the role of women that violated constitutional
principles, id. at 2831. "A state may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that
parents exercise over their children." Id. at 2830.
168. Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 375, 386 (stating that Roe decision should have emphasized
sexual equality grounded in Constitution rather than autonomy based on medicine).
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If Roe and Casey are cases about women's equality, they cannot stand
for the proposition that assisted suicide is a constitutional right. The
class of individuals who seek physician-assisted suicide is not defined
by sex, nor does it constitute a social group that has been recognized
as demanding special judicial solicitude. The prohibition of assisted
suicide may visit devastating suffering on individuals, but it does not
deform the social structure, for all citizens risk mortal illness.
Individuals who seek to exercise the "right to die" are not drawn from
any particular social or economic group. The capacity of debilitating
illnesses to devastate the lives of members of all social groups gives
apparent force to Justice Scalia's argument in Cruzan that, in these
matters, the political process is at least as likely as the judicial to give
the right answer because "the democratic majority [is required] to
accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you
and me."169
Under current American constitutional norms, this would be the
end of the matter. The prohibition on assisted suicide involves, in
current parlance, neither "suspect classification" nor "discriminatory
intent," and anything from moral preference to aesthetic taste will
meet an equal protection challenge that lacks these characteris-
tics."o Concerns about equality and subordination' 1t are not
The role of women's equality in the abortion controversy is more broadly recognized as a
deciding factor in the scholarly community than on the Court. Justice Scalia's opinion in Bray
v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, mustered a five member majority to reject the proposition
that, under § 1985(3) of the U.S. Code, opposition to abortion constituted "class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus." Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753,
758 (1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988)). That opinion went to some lengths to reaffirm
the holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and child-bearing do not constitute
invidious sex discrimination as a constitutional matter.
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor characterized a conspiracy to interfere with abortion rights
as invidious sex discrimination under § 1985(3) although not necessarily as a matter of
constitutional law. Id. at 801-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The opinions in Bray ofJustice
Souter, who concurred in part in the judgment and dissented in part, id. at 769, 777, and of
Justice Stevens, who dissented, id. at 779, 785-92, seem to acknowledge the element of gender-
based discrimination in efforts to interfere with abortions.
The substitution of Justice Ginsburg for Justice White may tip the balance of the Court,
assuming thatJustice Breyer agrees with his predecessor, Justice Blackmun.
169. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2863 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
170. A full analysis in terms of women's equality should account for the predominance of
women in the groups likely to be affected by the prohibition of physician-assisted suicide. The
predilection of men for modes of suicide that do not require the assistance of physicians (guns
rather than drugs, for example), and the higher proportion of women surviving to older ages
in states of extreme morbidity combine to suggest that the prohibition interferes with the
suicides of more women than men. But cf. van der Maas et al., supra note 60, at 671 (noting
that 61% of Dutch euthanasia/assisted suicides were male). It is substantially harder in
euthanasia cases than in the abortion cases, however, to link this interference uniquely to
women's biological characteristics, or to the stereotypical attitudes regarding women's roles that
characterize the abortion debate.
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exhausted, however, by the vision of the current majority of the
Supreme Court.
It is clear that the effect of the prohibition bears more heavily on
the less physically able. The Canadian Supreme Court reviewed its
prohibition under a Charter provision that forbids "discrimination
based on ... mental or physical disability.' 72 Access to efficacious
means of suicide for the physically able is not difficult: firearms (in
America), plastic bags, and high bridges are readily at hand in most
locales. Legally, self-regarding uses of such means are no longer
criminal offenses in American jurisdictions173 (although the effort
to use them may be grounds for involuntary commitment)." By
contrast, for many individuals who suffer from severe physical
conditions that impel them to seek suicide, their debilitating illnesses
make their unilateral use of conventional methods impossible. 75 If
it is unfair that women should alone be made to bear the burden of
our respect for the sanctity of life of the fetus, is it not equally unfair
that the costs of suffering in the interests of the "sanctity of human
life" at its end should rest disproportionately on the physically
impaired?' 76  We do not hold the able-bodied captive in suffering
to vindicate a social commitment to human life; perhaps we should
not so hold the handicapped.
There is more than a hint of paradox to these arguments. A policy
that keeps more handicapped than physically able persons alive is, on
its face, a doubtful candidate for condemnation as discrimination on
the basis of disability. In contrast to the prohibition on abortion,
which resulted in the deaths of thousands of women who sought the
171. The argument in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454,1466-67 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), that the opportunity to end one's life is a "fundamental interest" calling forth
heightened equal protection scrutiny seems to be premised on the trial court's earlier
conclusion that such an interest is indeed "fundamental" and constitutionally protected under
the reasoning of Roe and Casey. If, as I have argued, the abortion cases cannot generate the
initial constitutional protection, the argument for heightened equal protection scrutiny falls as
well.
172. CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 15(1).
173. See supra note 43.
174. See, e.g., Radmore v. R.N., 450 N.W.2d 758, 759-60 (N.D. 1990) (stating that North
Dakota law allows involuntary commitment when there exists clear and convincing evidence that
person needs treatment, and noting that definition of such need includes "suicidal threats,
attempts, or significant depression relevant to suicidal potential").
175. But ef. Bernat et al., supra note 44, at 2723 (suggesting that if patients are educated
about option to refuse hydration and nutrition, they will better control their futures).
176. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 107 D.L.RL4th 342, 358-59, 363-69 (Can. 1993)
(Lamer, CJ.C., dissenting) (stating that"persons with disabilities who are or will become unable
to end their lives without assistance are discriminated against ... since, unlike persons capable
of causing their own deaths, they are deprived of the option of choosing suicide"). This claim
is not literally true as long as the patient has the right to decline hydration. What patients are
deprived of is an option of choosing a quick and painless suicide.
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services of dangerous illicit practitioners to evade the law,' 77 the
claim is that the prohibition of assisted suicide and euthanasia
preserves the lives of a vulnerable minority. Indeed, if the issue is
whether handicapped persons as a group suffered a net gain or loss
to their interests from the prohibition, analogous to the effect of
abortion on the "ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the nation,"178 comparing the losses in
terms of extended suffering with the gains in terms of extended life
does not clearly indicate an invidious inequality.
In the Canadian litigation, one advocacy group for the handicapped
argued that the prohibition was necessary to protect the interests of
the handicapped as a group threatened with the risk of discriminatory
manipulation by others:
[T] he negative stereotypes and attitudes which exist about the lack
of value and quality inherent in the life of a person with a disability
are particularly dangerous in this context because they tend to
support the conclusion that a suicide was carried out in response
to those factors rather than because of pressure, coercion or
distress.
179
A recent New York report expressed similar concern that "those who
will be most vulnerable to abuse, error or indifference are the poor,
minorities, and those who are least educated and empowered" and
that "establishing a quick, painless death as a state sanctioned option
may mean that society becomes less committed to creating ways for
patients, especially those who are socially disadvantaged, to live longer
and better."' There is a disturbingly recurrent finding that groups
of lower socio-economic status are more likely to be at risk for inade-
177. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past: Pre-Roe Abortion Law in Action, 1 VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 309, 318 (1994) ("Evidence indicates that five to ten thousand women died
each year from complications resulting from illegal abortions during mid-twentieth century.").
178. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2797 (1992).
179. Rodriguez, 107 D.L.R.4th at 375 (quoting Coalition of Provincial Organizations of the
Handicapped).
180. TASK FoRcE ON LE AND THE LAW, supra note 47, at 120; see also id. ("[T]he risk of
harm is greatest for the many individuals in our society whose autonomy and well-being are
already compromised by poverty, lack of access to good medical care, advanced age, or
membership in a stigmatized social group."); id. at 124-25 (suggesting that most adverse impact
is on patients likely to be considered "hopeless," including AIDS patients, patients who pose
health risk such as multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis patients, patients who are least compliant,
such as mentally ill or drug addicted, and that "suicide and euthanasia will be practiced through
the prism of social inequality and prejudice .... Those who will be most vulnerable to abuse
error or indifference are the poor, minorities, and those who are least educated and
empowered."). But cf. Kathryn A. Koch et al, Changing Patterns of Terminal Care Management in
an Intensive Care Uni, 22 CRrricAL CARE MED. 233, 239 (1994) (observing thatwithdrawal of care
is most frequent among white women and men, followed by African American men and African
American women).
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quate pain control.1 81 And in Oregon, the plaintiffs have chal-
lenged the State's newly enacted initiative permitting assisted suicide
as denying the class of persons suffering from the disability of
"terminal illness" protection against risks of depressive suicide and
undue influence, in violation of both the Equal Protection Clause and
the Americans with Disabilities Act."2
To be sure, as Canadian Chief Justice Lamer argued, the "right to
choose" the manner of their death is, for some handicapped persons,
an unambiguous "advantage," and there is weight to the argument
that "limitations on [autonomy and self determination] should be
distributed with a measure of equality."i8 3 A belief that abortion is
in the interests of all women as a group is not necessary to sustain Roe
and Casey; a conviction that the State's policy is a differential
imposition on women's autonomy is sufficient. But in the issues we
are addressing, "autonomy" for some among the vulnerable means a
probability of unwilled death for others.
CONCLUSION
The laws of the State embody ideals, and part of the tragedy of
liberal society is that not all attractive ideals are compatible. The
problem of assisted suicide is one among many that requires the State
to establish some legitimate ideals at the expense of others.
To allow assisted suicide is to permit acts of compassion. It is to
have faith in the ability of doctors to be humane to patients. It allows
citizens to exert control over their lives in the service of the goals that
they have chosen. The watchwords of such a regime are autonomy
and faith in individual choice.
To prohibit assistance enshrines the State's responsibility to protect
the vulnerable and to affirm their connection to society. It embodies
the belief in the equal and ultimate worth of all members of the
polity. When a patient asks "May I die?," she may be seeking
assurance that her doctors and family still value her. When the State
says "legally, you may not," it tells the sufferer that she is still a valued
member of the community. It expresses a faith, as well, in the human
ability to redeem a life even in its last moments: a belief that dignity
can come not only from consistently executing a life plan but from a
181. See supra note 74. These results are also ambiguous about the effect of suicide on group
welfare. If members of lower status groups are more often left without adequate pain treatment,
they will more often choose unnecessary suicide. On the other hand, if suicide is unavailable,
they will more often suffer pain.
182. Lee Complaint, supra note 13.
183. Rodrigue 107 D.L.R4th at 366-67.
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spontaneous moment of transcendence.
The Constitution does not prevent the State from embracing the
ideals of autonomy and compassion. In the current political climate,
a combination of civil disobedience, prosecutorial discretion, ballot
initiatives, and legislative proposals exert pressure to allow doctors to
provide lethal assistance that has been hitherto forbidden. Should
these pressures triumph, the Constitution would not impel courts to
invalidate such a permissive stance despite its risks of rejection and
death.
But the choice embedded in today's legal structure is also constitu-
tionally legitimate. The very real costs to the liberty of some citizens
do not constitutionally require the State to abandon its policy of
protecting the vulnerable in choosing to live. By prohibiting
physicians from providing lethal assistance to their patients, the State
is permitted to establish that no patient has an obligation to die.
